Rajnath calls for deeper India-ASEAN defence ties

1. At a Glance

• What it is: Defence Minister Rajnath Singh used the maiden ASEAN-India Defence Think Tank Forum to call for deeper India-ASEAN defence and technology cooperation. He named three areas: joint research, co-production of military equipment and stronger maritime security [1].
• Strategic message: India wants an Indo-Pacific where countries, whatever their size, can make independent choices, protect their interests and develop peacefully [1][2].
• Why it matters for UPSC: The topic links several examinable themes: Act East Policy, SAGAR / MAHASAGAR, ASEAN centrality, ADMM-Plus, defence diplomacy and defence exports, and maritime domain awareness (MDA) [1].
• It is a ready example of Track 1.5 / Track 2 defence diplomacy, which runs through think tanks alongside government-to-government mechanisms [1][2].

2. Why in the News

• Wednesday, 14 October 2026: Rajnath Singh spoke at the 1st ASEAN-India Defence Think Tank Forum, held at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi. The report appeared in The Hindu's Chennai edition of 15 October 2026, p. 16 [1][2].
• Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General of MP-IDSA, shared the stage [1].
• Main points of the speech [1]:
• Pitched for joint research, co-production and enhanced maritime security to meet emerging regional challenges.
• Stressed mutual trust, respect for sovereignty, adherence to international law and open channels of dialogue for both conventional and emerging threats.
• Quote: "India believes that security is strengthened when countries build capacity together, respect international law and maintain trust through dialogue."
• Said the Act East policy, SAGAR and MAHASAGAR align with the ASEAN-led mechanisms that are central to India's Indo-Pacific approach.

• Named maritime domain awareness, interoperability and underwater surveillance as essential areas of cooperation.

• He also said India's approach and ASEAN's outlook on the Indo-Pacific can complement each other [2].

3. Background & Evolution

• 1992: India became a Dialogue Partner of ASEAN [6].
• 2022 (30th anniversary period): The relationship was raised to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) [6].
• February 2020: IDSA was renamed the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses to honour the late Defence Minister [7][12]. A plaque was unveiled in New Delhi on 15 November 2021 [8].
• May 2023: The first ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise (AIME) was held. It ended in the South China Sea on 8 May 2023 [3]. It is cited as part of the CSP and ADMM-Plus cooperation [6].
• ADMM-Plus track: India has held exercises under ADMM-Plus on maritime security and counter-terrorism, for example in Brunei and Singapore [9]. For the 2024–2027 cycle, India co-chairs the Experts' Working Group (EWG) on Counter-Terrorism with Malaysia [5].
• 2025: The Raksha Mantri attended the 12th ADMM-Plus in Kuala Lumpur [4].
• October 2026: The first ASEAN-India Defence Think Tank Forum was held in New Delhi [1][2].
• Related earlier initiative: the inaugural Delhi Defence Dialogue, where the Raksha Mantri spoke of building "Adaptive Defence" [10].

4. Core Static Facts

Item	Fact
Event	1st (maiden) ASEAN-India Defence Think Tank Forum [1][2]
Venue / host	MP-IDSA, New Delhi [1][2]
MP-IDSA DG	Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy [1]
MP-IDSA governance	The Raksha Mantri chairs the Executive Council of the institute's society [11]
SAGAR	Security and Growth for All in the Region [1]
MAHASAGAR	Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions [1]
India–ASEAN Dialogue Partner since	1992 [6]
Current status	Comprehensive Strategic Partnership [6]
AIME (1st edition)	~1,400 personnel, 9 ships; INS Delhi and INS Satpura; ended in the South China Sea on 8 May 2023 [3]
AIME ASEAN participants	Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam [3]
ADMM-Plus EWG on Counter-Terrorism	Co-chaired by India and Malaysia, 2024–27; 16th EWG meeting held in New Delhi, 14–16 Jan 2026 [5]
ADMM-Plus practical cooperation	Seven areas, including maritime security and counter-terrorism [5]
Nodal ministry (defence track)	Ministry of Defence. The ASEAN relationship as a whole is anchored in MEA [4][6]

5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

Geopolitical / Strategic

• The speech stresses independent choices for countries of every size. This is an implicit argument against coercion and spheres of influence in the Indo-Pacific [1][2].
• Tying India's policy to ASEAN-led mechanisms reaffirms ASEAN centrality, which is the basis of India's Indo-Pacific approach [1].
• AIME was held in the South China Sea with seven ASEAN navies. This shows India's operational presence in contested waters [3].

Maritime Security

• The speech named three priority areas: MDA, interoperability and underwater surveillance [1].
• Moving from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR widens India's maritime outlook from "the Region" to "Across Regions" [1].

Economic / Defence-Industrial

• Co-production of military equipment and joint research fit India's push to become a defence exporter and to build self-reliance with partners [1].
• Bilateral defence dialogues, such as the 3rd India-Indonesia Defence Ministers' Dialogue in New Delhi, add to this ASEAN-level effort [13].

Scientific / Technological

• "Technological cooperation" and emerging security threats point to new areas such as underwater domain awareness and dual-use technology [1].

Governance / Diplomatic Architecture

• Think-tank forums (Track 1.5/2) sit alongside official tracks: ADMM-Plus and its EWGs (Track 1), and AIME (operational) [1][5][3].
• The emphasis on international law and dialogue places India as a supporter of a rules-based order [1].

6. Recent Developments (last 12–18 months)

• 2025: The Raksha Mantri attended the 12th ADMM-Plus, Kuala Lumpur [4].
• 2025: The 3rd India-Indonesia Defence Ministers' Dialogue was co-chaired in New Delhi, and both sides agreed to deepen defence ties [13].
• 14–16 January 2026: The 16th ADMM-Plus EWG on Counter-Terrorism and the Final Planning Conference for a Table Top Exercise were held in New Delhi [5].
• 14 October 2026: The maiden ASEAN-India Defence Think Tank Forum was held at MP-IDSA, with Rajnath Singh's keynote [1][2].

7. Prelims Hooks

• The first ASEAN-India Defence Think Tank Forum was held at MP-IDSA, New Delhi, in October 2026 [1][2].
• MAHASAGAR = Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions [1].
• SAGAR = Security and Growth for All in the Region [1].
• India became an ASEAN Dialogue Partner in 1992 [6].
• India-ASEAN ties are now a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership [6].
• The first ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise (AIME) ended in the South China Sea on 8 May 2023 [3].
• AIME-2023: ~1,400 personnel, 9 ships; Indian ships were INS Delhi and INS Satpura [3].
• India co-chairs the ADMM-Plus EWG on Counter-Terrorism with Malaysia for 2024–2027 [5].
• ADMM-Plus covers seven areas of practical cooperation [5].
• IDSA was renamed Manohar Parrikar IDSA in February 2020 [7][12].
• The Raksha Mantri chairs the Executive Council of MP-IDSA's society [11].
• The 12th ADMM-Plus was held in Kuala Lumpur [4].
• The Delhi Defence Dialogue is linked to the Raksha Mantri's idea of "Adaptive Defence" [10].

8. Why Three ASEAN Members Stayed Out of the First Joint Exercise

• The forum speaks of 'ASEAN', but India's defence partners are really a smaller group inside ASEAN
• The first ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise (AIME) had seven ASEAN navies: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam [3].
• Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar were not in the list [3].

• So 'India-ASEAN defence cooperation' in practice means working with the members who want it. It is not the whole bloc acting together.

• ASEAN centrality cuts both ways

• ASEAN centrality (the idea that ASEAN, not a big power, should sit in the driver's seat of regional security talks) is what India supports [1].
• But ASEAN takes decisions by consensus (everyone must agree). One member who is unwilling can slow down or water down any joint defence step.

• India has tied its Indo-Pacific approach to ASEAN-led mechanisms [1]. So India's plans can only go as fast as ASEAN's slowest member.

• Why this matters for the exam

• Use this to answer the 'limitations' part of a question on ADMM-Plus. The most likely route for India's plans is bilateral ties with willing states, for example the India-Indonesia Defence Ministers' Dialogue [13]. The ASEAN-wide label sits on top of those ties.

9. Selling Missiles Is Not the Same as Making Them Together

• India has buyers in Southeast Asia, but no shared production lines yet
• In January 2022 the Philippines signed a deal worth about $375 million for a shore-based BrahMos anti-ship missile system. It was the first export contract for BrahMos [14].
• The first delivery went by an Indian Air Force aircraft in April 2024 [16]. In July 2026 India announced BrahMos and Astra missiles for Indonesia [15].

• All of these are sales of finished weapons. Rajnath Singh's call was for co-production (both countries making parts of the equipment, with shared factories and technology) and joint research [1]. That is a much bigger step.

• Why co-production is harder than export

• BrahMos is itself made by a joint venture of DRDO and Russia's NPOM [14]. So India cannot freely share or move its production to a third country. The technology partner also has a say.

• Co-production means sharing designs and know-how. India's own push for self-reliance pulls the other way, because it wants to keep key technology at home.

• The export numbers are real, but they tell a narrow story

• India's defence exports reached a record ₹38,424 crore in FY 2025-26 [15].
• A record export figure shows that India can sell. It does not show that India can build a defence industry together with ASEAN partners. Keep the two ideas apart in your answer.

10. Does This Push ASEAN Into Taking Sides? The Strongest Objection

• The objection, stated fairly
• Singh said India wants an Indo-Pacific where every country, big or small, makes its own choices [1][2].
• But India's biggest defence deals are with the Philippines and Indonesia [14][15]. The Philippines has an open dispute with China in the South China Sea, and AIME itself ended in those waters [3].

• A critic in Beijing, or a cautious ASEAN capital, can argue: missiles for one claimant and naval exercises in disputed waters are not neutral acts. They pull ASEAN towards a side, and that is the very thing 'independent choices' is supposed to avoid.

• What is right about this objection

• It is true that arms sales change the balance at sea. An anti-ship missile on the Philippine coast matters most in one particular dispute.

• It is also true that ASEAN members see China very differently. That is one reason three members were absent from AIME [3].

• India's best answer

• India sells to the partner who asks. It does not ask the buyer to join a bloc or to cut ties with anyone.
• India's exercises are open to all ASEAN members, and they run through ASEAN-led platforms such as ADMM-Plus [5][3]. They are not part of a US-led alliance.

• India's line rests on international law (mainly UNCLOS, the UN treaty on sea rights) and on capacity building, not on naming a rival [1]. This lets ASEAN states take India's help without being seen as anti-China.

• Balanced verdict for Mains: India's approach supports ASEAN's freedom to choose. But it does strengthen some members more than others. An honest answer admits that tension.

11. Think-Tank Talks: Useful, but They Bind No One

• Why this forum is 'Track 1.5', not true Track 2
• Track 2 means talks between independent experts. Track 1.5 means experts and officials sitting together.
• MP-IDSA is funded by the government, and the Raksha Mantri chairs its Executive Council [11]. The Defence Minister himself gave the keynote [1].

• So ASEAN participants will read what is said here as close to the official Indian line. That gives the forum weight, but it gives up some of the freedom that makes Track 2 useful for testing new ideas.

• The forum adds talk, not commitments

• The forum's three goals were joint research, co-production and maritime security [1]. None comes with a budget, a deadline or a signed agreement.

• Binding work still happens in the official track: the ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Groups and their table-top exercises [5].

• What should follow

• MoD and MP-IDSA can make the forum feed the official track. It could send its ideas to the ADMM-Plus EWG on Counter-Terrorism, which India already co-chairs with Malaysia for 2024–27 [5].
• The Indian Navy and ASEAN navies need to hold AIME as a regular exercise, not a one-off. Only one edition, in 2023, is on record [3]. Underwater surveillance and MDA (maritime domain awareness: knowing what ships and submarines are moving in your waters) need repeated drills and shared data, not one-time events [1].

12. Anchors for Answers

• Data: BrahMos shore-based anti-ship missile deal with the Philippines, about $375 million, signed January 2022, the first BrahMos export [14]
• Data: India's defence exports reached a record ₹38,424 crore in FY 2025-26 [15]
• Data: First AIME (2023): about 1,400 personnel, 9 ships and 7 of ASEAN's members. Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar were absent [3]
• Law/Case: UNCLOS, the legal base for India's call for 'adherence to international law' at sea [1]
• Comparison: Philippines and Indonesia buy finished Indian missiles (BrahMos, Astra) rather than co-producing them, which shows the gap between exporting and co-production [14][15]
• Scheme: SAGAR → MAHASAGAR and Act East Policy, the policy frames Singh tied to ASEAN-led mechanisms [1]

13. Mains Relevance

• GS-II: India and its neighbourhood; bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India; effect of other countries' policies on India's interests.
• GS-III: Security challenges and their management in border areas; maritime security; indigenisation of technology (defence co-production).
• Possible questions: 1. Defence cooperation is emerging as the third pillar of India's Act East Policy after trade and connectivity. Examine with reference to India-ASEAN relations. (15 marks) 2. Moving from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR reflects an expansion in India's maritime vision. Discuss its implications for India's engagement with Southeast Asia. (10 marks) 3. How do ASEAN-centric mechanisms such as ADMM-Plus help India's pursuit of a free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific? Discuss their limitations. (15 marks)

14. Related Topics to Study Next

• ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP): Singh said India's approach and ASEAN's outlook complement each other [2].
• ADMM / ADMM-Plus and its EWGs: the main official defence platform for India and ASEAN [5].
• AIME and bilateral naval exercises: the operational side of maritime cooperation [3].
• SAGAR → MAHASAGAR: India's evolving maritime doctrine [1].
• South China Sea disputes and UNCLOS: the background to "adherence to international law" [1][3].
• India's defence exports (e.g., to Southeast Asia): links to co-production and joint research [1].
• Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) and Quad: compare them with ASEAN-led mechanisms.
• India-Indonesia defence ties: a bilateral track that adds to ASEAN-level engagement [13].

15. NCERT Concepts to Revise

• South China Sea (Geography): Setting of the first India-ASEAN maritime exercise and the contested waters behind the talk of international law.
• United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Geography): The treaty behind 'adherence to international law' in maritime disputes, which India and ASEAN states cite.
• Sovereignty (Polity): Respect for sovereignty is one of the speech's core principles, and it underpins countries' 'independent choices'.
• Self-reliance (Economy): Co-production and joint research tie into India's push for defence self-reliance and indigenisation.
• Bay of Bengal (Geography): Key maritime theatre for India's SAGAR and MAHASAGAR outlook and its link to Southeast Asia.

16. Common Errors / Trap Areas

• SAGAR vs MAHASAGAR: MAHASAGAR says "Across Regions" and starts with "Mutual and Holistic Advancement". SAGAR says "for All in the Region" [1].
• Wrong venue or institute: The forum was at MP-IDSA. IDSA was renamed in 2020, but the plaque was unveiled in 2021. Don't mix up the two years [7][8].
• Wrong partner year: India became a Dialogue Partner in 1992. Later upgrades were to strategic and then comprehensive strategic partnership. Don't confuse the 1992 date with those [6].
• Wrong EWG co-chair: India co-chairs the Counter-Terrorism EWG with Malaysia for 2024–27. It is not the maritime security EWG [5].
• Wrong AIME location: The first AIME ended in the South China Sea, not the Andaman Sea or the Bay of Bengal [3].