Assess how India–US defence cooperation has developed in recent years. Does it strengthen or weaken India's strategic autonomy?

India–US defence ties have grown from buying and selling equipment into a broad partnership covering institutions and operations. The 10-year Framework for the Major Defence Partnership, signed at Kuala Lumpur in October 2025, sets the direction for the next decade [3]. On balance, the partnership adds to India's capabilities without tying it to an alliance.

Evolution of cooperation

• Foundational agreements: India and the US signed LEMOA (2016), COMCASA (2018) and BECA (2020). These cover logistics, secure communications and geospatial data, which together make it possible for the two militaries to work as one [2].
• Institutional dialogue: The 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue has run since 2018 [2]. The Joint Technical Group under DRDO takes forward cooperation in defence science and technology [4].
• Operational jointness: Tiger Triumph began in 2019 as a tri-service HADR exercise [5]. In 2025 it included an amphibious landing at Kakinada [6]. The 2026 edition was a tabletop exercise. It brought in the NDRF for the first time and aimed at Combined Joint All-Domain Operations [1].
• Strategic framing: The 2026 release links the exercise to the convergence of India–US strategic maritime interests in the Indo-Pacific [1].

Ways it strengthens strategic autonomy

• Capability building: Access to advanced systems and technology cooperation reduces the gaps that limit India's choices [2][4].
• Consent stays with India: Quad HADR guidelines require a request for assistance before partners act together [7]. Joint action is a choice India makes each time, not a standing commitment.
• Calibrated formats: Bilateral HADR exercises build interoperability without treaty obligations. The NDRF's participation also adds a civilian element [1].

Risks that could weaken it

• Dual-use skills: Joint command and all-domain planning [1] are also combat skills. This raises the cost of staying aloof if a crisis comes.
• Platform and data dependence: Relying on US systems and shared networks [2] can give Washington influence over India's decisions.
• Perception costs: Closer alignment may strain India's other partnerships.

Assessment India–US defence cooperation has become institutionalised, interoperable and focused on technology. Because India decides each instance of cooperation, through consent rules and its choice of formats, the partnership has so far widened India's options rather than narrowing them. Going forward, India should combine co-development under the 10-year framework [3] with Atmanirbharta, a diverse set of partners and issue-based alignment. That keeps strategic autonomy flexible and active, serving a free and open Indo-Pacific.