Bilateral exercises are said to be as much about signalling as about interoperability. Evaluate this in the context of India's maritime engagements.

Bilateral naval exercises do two jobs. They build interoperability, which is the ability of two navies to operate together, and they send political signals to partners and rivals. India's recent engagements show that the two are linked, and that signalling often decides how much interoperability is actually practised.

Exercises as signalling

• The venue carries a message: INDRA 2026 was held at Vladivostok, Russia's Pacific Fleet base. PIB linked it to the 23rd India–Russia Annual Summit and the MAHASAGAR vision [1][2].
• Multi-alignment: Weeks earlier, the same INS Sahyadri took part in the ADMM-Plus maritime security activity at Subic Bay, co-chaired by Japan [3]. One deployment covered both camps, which is strategic autonomy in practice.
• Calibrated content: The 2026 Sea Phase covered only medical evacuation, helicopter operations and communications [1]. INDRA 2025 included live weapon firings and anti-air drills [4]. With Russia under Western sanctions, the lighter menu kept the political signal small.
• Continuity: INDRA was held in a "non-contact, at sea only" format during COVID-19 [5], and the 23rd Summit "appreciated" the exercises [6].

Exercises as interoperability

• Stated aims: The exercise covered coordinated manoeuvring, integrated communications and Subject Matter Expert Exchanges [1].
• Practical need: Many of the Navy's aviation assets are Russian-origin, so it still depends on the original manufacturers for maintenance and spares (Standing Committee on Defence) [7]. Working closely with Russia's navy therefore has operational value.
• HADR capability: The ADMM-Plus sea phase practised search and rescue, casualty evacuation and hydrographic survey [3]. These skills support India's role as a first responder in the region.

Evaluation

• Where signalling outruns substance: The 23rd Summit set no new goals for INDRA beyond "maintaining momentum" [6]. The exercise is kept going for continuity rather than made more ambitious.
• Limits of autonomy: India's dependence on Russian spares limits its freedom of choice [7]. This shows that a signal is credible only when real capability stands behind it.

On balance, the statement largely holds. In India's case, choosing how much interoperability to practise is itself a signal. To keep both purposes credible, India should hold exercises regularly with clear goals, build its own capacity to maintain Russian-origin equipment, and keep deepening ties with diverse partners. Together these support the MAHASAGAR vision and India's strategic autonomy.