"Defence cooperation remains the bedrock of India–Russia relations despite shifting global alignments." Examine this with reference to recent joint military exercises.
New · District CollectorCan you hold the district for 72 hours?Floods, a heatwave, an outbreak, a grievance queue. Take the decisions, see the consequences.Play →India–Russia military-technical cooperation has moved "from a buyer-seller framework" to joint research, development and production [6]. Recent naval and Army editions of INDRA show that this pillar has held even as India draws closer to the West. They also show that its foundations are under strain.
Exercises showing a durable bedrock
- Continuity and depth: The Navy's 14th INDRA (Mar–Apr 2025, Chennai and the Bay of Bengal) included live weapon firings and anti-air operations [3]. The Army's 14th edition at Bikaner (Oct 2025) involved over 250 personnel from each side [6].
- Far East reach: INS Sahyadri exercised with the Russian Navy at Vladivostok in Oct 2026. PIB linked this to the MAHASAGAR vision and the 23rd Annual Summit [2]. Its harbour and sea phases covered interoperability, helicopter operations and medical evacuation [1].
- Political backing: The 23rd Summit statement appreciated INDRA and pledged to maintain momentum [5]. The Military-Technical Cooperation Agreement 2021–31 provides a ten-year framework [6].
- Operational necessity: Many of the Navy's aviation assets are Russian-origin, so it still depends on the original manufacturers (OEMs) for maintenance and spares [7].
Shifting alignments: limits of the bedrock
- Multi-alignment: A few weeks before Vladivostok, the same Sahyadri took part in the ASEAN-led ADMM-Plus maritime security activity at Subic Bay [4]. India's exercises signal strategic autonomy, not exclusive alignment.
- Dependence as vulnerability: MoD bans engaging OEMs. An Empowered Committee has to grant a waiver each time an overseas repair is needed [7]. Russia is at war and under sanctions, which makes the supply of spares uncertain.
- Repeated, unmet pledges: Summit texts keep promising joint manufacture of spares in India through technology transfer and joint ventures [5], but name no specific projects. They also set no new goals for INDRA.
- Western sensitivities: Exercising with a sanctioned Russia can strain India's coordination with Quad partners.
Recent exercises confirm that defence remains the bedrock of the relationship. However, it now rests more on legacy platforms and hedging than on exclusive dependence. The way forward is to turn the spares pledges into joint ventures with deadlines and to build repair capacity in India for Russian-origin aircraft. Building more warships at home under Aatmanirbhar Bharat would also help. Together these steps would keep the partnership a matter of choice and make India's strategic autonomy real.
Sources
- 1Conclusion of India-Russia Bilateral Naval Exercise (INDRA 2026), PIBharbour and sea phases; interoperability, helicopter and medical evacuation drills
- 2Indian Naval Ship Sahyadri arrives at Vladivostok, Russia, for bilateral exercise INDRA-2026, PIBVladivostok deployment; MAHASAGAR and 23rd Summit framing
- 3Indian and Russian Navies set for the 14th edition of maritime bilateral exercise, PIBINDRA 2025 at Chennai; live firings and anti-air operations
- 4Indian Naval Ships Sahyadri and Kulish conclude participation in ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Joint Cooperation Activity, PIBSubic Bay activity, Sep 2026
- 5Joint Statement following the 23rd India–Russia Annual Summit, PIBINDRA appreciated; pledge on joint manufacture of spares
- 6From Strategic Partnership to Special and Privileged Bond: India-Russia Relations at a Glance, PIBshift from buyer-seller model; Army INDRA 2025 at Bikaner; Military-Technical Cooperation Agreement 2021–31
- 7Demand for Grants 2026-27 Analysis: Defence, PRS Legislative ResearchRussian-origin naval aviation assets; OEM dependence; Empowered Committee waivers