·The Hindu·15 marks·250–350 words

The Bilkis Bano judgment (2024) redefined the contours of executive remission in India. Examine the principle of 'appropriate government' and its implications for cooperative federalism.

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In this answer
  1. Principle of 'appropriate government'
  2. Implications for cooperative federalism

In Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India (2024 INSC 24), the Supreme Court struck down Gujarat's remission orders of 10 August 2022 for 11 life convicts. It held that Gujarat was not the "appropriate government" under Section 432(7) CrPC [1]. The ruling links remission power to the State that delivered justice, not the State where the crime happened, and this changes how States must coordinate on sentencing.

Principle of 'appropriate government'

  • Statutory basis: Section 432(7) CrPC (now Section 473, BNSS 2023) gives remission power to the government of the State where the offender was tried and sentenced [1].
  • Trial forum, not crime site: The trial was moved to Maharashtra to secure fairness. So only Maharashtra could grant remission, not Gujarat, even though the crime took place there and the convicts were held there [1].
  • Exclusive competence: Applying Union of India v. V. Sriharan, the Court held that only one government can be competent. Two States cannot share the power [1].
  • Discretion is reviewable: The orders were "stereotyped" and passed without application of mind. The May 2022 order that set the process in motion had been obtained by "fraud on the court" [1].
  • This statutory power is separate from constitutional clemency under Articles 72 and 161.

Implications for cooperative federalism

Strengthening effects

  • Ends forum-shopping: Convicts cannot use a more lenient policy in the State that holds them in prison [1].
  • Protects transferred trials: A State from which the Supreme Court moved a trial cannot undo the verdict through executive action. This protects the integrity of the judicial process across States.
  • Clear division of roles: The sentencing State decides remission and the custodial State carries out the decision. The two act together rather than competing.

Friction points

  • Split responsibility: Prisons are on the State List (Entry 4), so one State holds the prisoner while another holds the remission power. Conduct records and reports must be shared between them.
  • Uneven policies: State remission rules differ widely. The Centre's 2018 Gandhi-150 special remission left out rape convicts [2], but there is no binding national minimum standard.
  • Centre–State consultation: When the CBI has investigated a case, Section 435 CrPC requires the State to consult the Centre. This makes cooperation between the two a legal duty.

The judgment turns remission from a privilege based on territory into a reasoned duty of the sentencing State. Three steps would build on it: MHA model remission guidelines that exclude grave offences, an inter-State protocol for sharing prison records, and time-bound consultation with the Centre. Together these would make remission federal in structure but uniform in fairness, grounded in the rule of law and Article 14's guarantee against arbitrary action.

Sources

  1. 1Supreme Court of India, *Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Ors.*, 2024 INSC 24 – Digital SCR: the "appropriate government" under Section 432(7) is the sentencing State (Maharashtra); 10.08.2022 remission orders quashed; application of *V. Sriharan*; orders "stereotyped" and passed without application of mind; May 2022 order obtained by fraud on the court
  2. 2PM India / Cabinet decision: Special Remission to Prisoners on the 150th Birth Anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi (2018): rape convicts excluded from the special remission

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