How can India use its 10-year Major Defence Partnership framework with the US to strengthen its domestic defence industrial base without diluting strategic autonomy?

India and the US signed the 10-year Framework for the US-India Major Defence Partnership at the 12th ADMM-Plus in Kuala Lumpur in October 2025. It gives "a unified vision and policy direction" for defence cooperation [1]. India can use it to build its own defence industry, provided the gains come as capacity built at home rather than greater dependence on the US.

Using the framework to build the domestic industrial base

• Co-production over purchase: shift from buying finished weapons to building them in India. The 2025 Joint Statement already plans co-production of Javelin missiles and Stryker vehicles in India [2]. This matters because India was the world's second-largest arms importer in 2020-24 [3].
• Target real gaps: point technology cooperation at shortfalls such as the IAF's 31 fighter squadrons against 42 authorised [3], for example in engines and avionics.
• Technology access: follow up on the US pledge to review arms-transfer rules, including ITAR, and on talks for a Reciprocal Defence Procurement agreement [2]. Get technology-access terms in writing before placing large orders.
• Supply-chain integration: use the Autonomous Systems Industry Alliance [2] to connect Indian MSMEs and start-ups to US supply chains and build export capacity.
• Money at home: capital outlay is only 29% of the 2026-27 defence budget, while the Standing Committee on Defence recommends 40% [3]. Without more capital spending, co-production cannot grow.

Protecting strategic autonomy

• Partner, not ally: the framework sets policy direction and is not a treaty [1]. India should keep cooperation issue-based and avoid commitments that tie it into US-China rivalry.
• Diversify partners: the 'RAKSHA' defence diplomacy roadmap (2026) widens India's partnerships beyond Washington and promotes Make-in-India exports [4]. This gives India room to bargain.
• Avoid single-source lock-in: make sure maintenance, spares and overhaul happen in India, as the 2025 statement envisages [2], so supply cannot be cut off or used as leverage.

Used well, the framework can turn India from a buyer into a co-producer. If India pairs US technology access with higher capital spending and a wide range of partners, the partnership will advance Atmanirbhar Bharat while keeping its strategic autonomy intact. India would then be a capable partner by its own choice, not a dependent one.