Central Asia occupies a pivotal place in India's extended neighbourhood strategy. Analyse India's engagement with Uzbekistan in the context of connectivity, energy, and trade.

Doubly-landlocked Uzbekistan, bordering every other Central Asian state, is the natural anchor of India's "extended neighbourhood". Prime Minister Modi's Tashkent visit of August 2026 — his fourth — ahead of the Bishkek SCO Summit [6], shows the relationship shifting from civilisational goodwill to a functional connectivity–energy–trade triad, though the three legs progress unevenly.

Connectivity: the binding constraint

• Denied overland transit through Pakistan, India routes cargo via Chabahar Port and the International North-South Transport Corridor, whose joint use Uzbekistan reaffirmed at the 4th India-Central Asia Dialogue (June 2025) [5].
• An India–Iran–Uzbekistan trilateral on Chabahar transit gives Tashkent sea access and India a Pakistan-bypassing corridor [5].
• Limitation: these routes remain hostage to sanctions risk on Iran and instability in Afghanistan, keeping freight volumes thin.

Energy: from hydrocarbons to atoms and minerals

• Cooperation is nuclear-led rather than pipeline-led: a long-term contract with Uzbekistan's Navoi Mining & Metallurgical Combinat covers supply of 1,100 MT of natural uranium ore concentrates (2022–2026) for India's IAEA-safeguarded reactors [4].
• Uzbek reserves of uranium and critical minerals align with India's clean-energy and supply-chain diversification needs [4].
• Limitation: absent an overland pipeline, gas trade is effectively foreclosed — energy ties are confined to what is shippable.

Trade and investment: high intent, low base

• Bilateral trade stands at roughly US$1.5 billion, with the Commerce Minister calling for it to double within three years at the India-Uzbekistan Business Forum (2026) [2].
• Institutional scaffolding exists — a Bilateral Investment Treaty signed at Tashkent [3] alongside lines of credit and a special strategic partnership [1].
• Growth sectors are pharmaceuticals, IT, textiles and food processing [2], yet India's share remains marginal against China's.

Thus connectivity is the bottleneck on which the energy and trade legs depend. Operationalising Chabahar-INSTC at scale, converting the BIT into actual investment flows, and widening uranium ties into a critical-minerals partnership would let India match its civilisational depth with commercial weight — turning the SCO platform into genuine strategic presence in Central Asia.