How do changes in U.S. leadership affect minilateral groupings in the Indo-Pacific? Discuss the implications for India's strategic autonomy.

Minilaterals are small, issue-based groupings like the Quad, AUKUS and I2U2. They have no treaty or secretariat, so they depend on political will in Washington. The Quad is the clearest test. At Wilmington (2024), the leaders agreed that India would host the 2025 summit [1]. A new U.S. administration took office, and that summit never happened.

Impact of U.S. leadership change on minilaterals

Disruptive effects

• Agenda reset: Each new administration re-prioritises. Trump left the TPP in 2017, and IPEF depends on how much Washington invests in it.
• Summit paralysis: Trump and Modi had pledged a New Delhi Quad summit [2]. No leaders' summit followed in 2025 [3].
• Bilateral spillover: Trade frictions between the U.S. and a partner slow down group-level cooperation.

Stabilising effects

• Ministerial continuity: Foreign ministers met in January and July 2025 (Washington) and in May 2026 (New Delhi) [3].
• Functional, interest-based tracks: These include the Critical Minerals Framework (2026) [3], IPMDA maritime surveillance [1], and energy and fertiliser security [4].
• Revival: Washington has announced a Manila leaders' meeting and calls the Quad "not anti-anybody" [5].

Implications for India's strategic autonomy

Constraints

• Agenda-setting lost: The summit moved to an ASEAN venue, so India lost its turn as host.
• Exposure to U.S. politics: Security cooperation slows whenever ties with Washington sour.

Opportunities

• Hedging is validated: India's memberships in BRICS, SCO and the Quad are insurance, not contradiction.
• Leadership space: Hosting the 2026 ministerial meeting [3] showed that India can keep the work going even without a summit.
• ASEAN centrality: A Manila venue reassures Southeast Asian states that do not want to pick sides.

U.S. leadership change ──► Summit track stalls
                     └──► Ministerial + functional tracks continue ──► Quad survives

Fig: Two-tier resilience of the Quad

Changes in U.S. leadership weaken minilaterals at the top, but working-level cooperation keeps them alive. India should press for a fixed yearly ministerial meeting and lead on supply-chain and maritime projects that do not depend on who governs in Washington. It should also keep its own tools, such as IPOI and ties with ASEAN, running alongside the Quad. That way India gains from minilaterals without depending on them, which keeps its strategic autonomy intact.