"Climate finance is less a matter of charity than of legal obligation under Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement." Critically examine this in the light of India's position at COP31.
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Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement says developed countries "shall provide" financial resources to developing countries for both mitigation and adaptation [1]. India's position for COP31 (Antalya, November 2026) rests on this wording. It asks for finance that is "predictable, largely public and concessional" [2]. The statement is sound in law but weak in practice.
Why climate finance is an obligation, not charity
- Binding language: Article 9.1 uses "shall" and continues "existing obligations under the Convention." This roots finance in CBDR-RC (Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities), not in goodwill [1].
- India's institutional ask: India wants a COP31 decision to start a Climate Finance Work Programme that sets the quantity, quality and access of finance. It also says finance must not add to developing countries' debt burden [2].
- Scale of need: Developing countries will need about US$310–365 billion a year for adaptation by 2035. That is 12–14 times what they now receive, a gap that one-off pledges cannot close [3].
- Just transition: India wants the Just Transition Work Programme continued. Without finance, cutting coal shifts the cost onto workers in coal-dependent regions [2].
Limits of the "legal obligation" claim
- No amount, no enforcement: Article 9.1 sets no figure and no penalty. The Glasgow pledge to double adaptation finance to about US$40 billion by 2025 will be missed on current trends [3].
- Disputed accounting: UNEP finds public adaptation finance fell from US$28 billion (2022) to US$26 billion (2023). Multilateral development bank reports show a rise because they count different things [3]. A vaguely defined duty is hard to enforce.
- Narrow donor base: Article 9.2 only "encourages" other Parties to contribute [1]. This keeps the duty-holders few.
- Credibility trade-off: India rejects fossil-fuel "phase-out" language and wants Global Goal on Adaptation indicators to stay voluntary [2]. Vulnerable countries facing disasters such as the Nepal glacier collapse may see this as asking for money without matching ambition. UN News calls COP31 a "test of trust" [4].
Article 9.1 does make finance a legal duty, but without numbers, common counting rules or review it works more like a political promise. At COP31, India should push for a common definition of climate finance within the Work Programme. It should also seek fixed review dates and voluntary indicators paired with funding to build data systems, and set out a credible national coal-transition plan. Together these would turn CBDR-RC from a slogan into a working compact, which would advance SDG 13 and restore trust in multilateralism.
Sources
- 1Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015), Articles 9.1–9.2: "shall provide" obligation; Article 9.2 only "encourages" other Parties
- 2The Hindu, "India to push for predictable climate finance, equitable transition at key UN summit" (4 Nov 2026): India's COP31 asks (predictable, public, concessional finance; Climate Finance Work Programme; Just Transition Work Programme; no phase-out language; voluntary adaptation indicators)
- 3UNEP, Adaptation Gap Report 2025: *Running on Empty*: US$310–365 billion need; 12–14× gap; US$28 billion → US$26 billion fall; Glasgow doubling goal to be missed; UNEP vs development bank accounting
- 4UN News, "As disasters mount, next UN climate summit faces a test of trust" (Oct 2026): Nepal disaster; "test of trust" framing