Coalition politics in fragmented legislatures often gives disproportionate leverage to smaller parties. Discuss with examples from India and abroad.
New · District CollectorCan you hold the district for 72 hours?Floods, a heatwave, an outbreak, a grievance queue. Take the decisions, see the consequences.Play →When no party wins a majority, a small party whose seats can tip the balance gains bargaining power far beyond its vote share. It becomes a "kingmaker". Israel's Knesset in November 2026 and India's post-2024 coalition show that this leverage can serve democracy but can also distort it.
How smaller parties gain leverage
- Pivotal arithmetic: In Israel's 120-member Knesset, opposition candidate Matan Kahana won the Speakership 66–52. He won only because Arab-led parties voted with the Jewish-led opposition, in the first floor test after the 27 October 2026 election [1].
- Agenda control: That win gave the new majority control of the House. Reports called it a key step towards rolling back the outgoing Netanyahu government's policies [1].
- Resource bargaining: After 2024, the BJP-led government depended on allies such as the TDP and JD(U). Union Budget 2024-25 then promised ₹15,000 crore for Andhra Pradesh's capital. It also announced road, power and flood-control projects for Bihar [2].
- Threat of exit: In 1999, the Vajpayee government lost a confidence vote by a single vote after the AIADMK withdrew support.
Positive side
- Voice for minorities and regions: Groups that would otherwise be sidelined, such as Arab-led parties in Israel, gain a say in national outcomes [1]. In India, regional parties bring state concerns to the Union and strengthen cooperative federalism.
- Consensus-building: Coalition partners have to negotiate. The Common Minimum Programme model is an example of this moderating effect.
Negative side
- Skewed allocation: Demands tied to a single state can pull national resources away from need-based criteria. Critics raised this concern about the 2024 packages [2].
- Instability and horse-trading: Ministerial posts get traded for support. The 91st Amendment (2003) therefore capped the size of the Union Council of Ministers at 15% of the Lok Sabha's strength and tightened the Tenth Schedule.
- Governance delays: Even after winning the Speaker vote, Eisenkot still had up to five more weeks to form a government [1]. A majority for one vote does not guarantee a stable government.
Way forward
- Agree on a written Common Minimum Programme and set up coordination committees.
- Route special transfers to states through rule-based channels such as the Finance Commission (Art. 280).
- Keep the Speaker neutral and decide anti-defection cases quickly.
Overall, small parties' leverage is a natural result of representing a diverse electorate. Strong institutions can turn it from bargaining over favours into a check on the majority. This keeps coalition politics in line with the constitutional ideals of federalism and unity in diversity.
Sources
- 1Israeli Parliament elects new Knesset Speaker backed by Netanyahu's opponents, The Hindu/AP, Nov 202666–52 vote, Arab-led parties' support, 27 Oct election, rollback of policies, five-week window for coalition formation
- 2Union Budget 2024-25 Speech, Ministry of Finance₹15,000 crore support for Andhra Pradesh and infrastructure projects for Bihar
Practice
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