Critically evaluate the Baku-to-Belém Roadmap to US$1.3 trillion. Can it meet the climate finance needs of the Global South? What role should India play?
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The Baku-to-Belém Roadmap is a report by the COP29 and COP30 Presidencies. It sets out how to mobilise at least US$1.3 trillion a year for developing countries by 2035 [1]. It is a useful guide, but it is non-binding and relies mostly on mobilising money. On its own, it cannot meet the Global South's needs.
Strengths
- Realistic about scale: the need runs into trillions, so the Roadmap combines public, MDB and private capital [1].
- Concrete action fronts: these include replenishing grants and concessional finance and rebalancing fiscal space and debt sustainability [1].
- Targets can be met: developed countries crossed the US$100 billion goal in 2022 (US$115.9 billion), although two years late [3].
Weaknesses
- Weak legal basis: Article 9.1 says developed countries "shall provide" finance. The Roadmap rests on the softer Article 9.3 language of mobilising it [2]. It is a Presidencies' report, not a negotiated decision, so it creates no new obligation [1].
- Bias towards loans: close to 90% of MDB climate finance came as loans in 2016–22 [3]. Low-emitting countries such as Nepal then pay for disaster recovery with debt that their children inherit.
- Neglects adaptation: developing countries need US$310–365 billion a year for adaptation by 2035, but only US$26 billion of international public adaptation finance arrived in 2023. The Glasgow pledge to double adaptation finance is off track [4]. Flood walls earn no revenue, so private investors stay away.
Can it meet the needs? Only partly. It can work for mitigation projects that earn revenue. It cannot replace grants for adaptation and loss and damage. UNEP warns that the Roadmap will help only if the money comes as grants and concessional finance, not more debt [4].
Role for India
- Defend Article 9.1: in the Climate Finance Work Programme, India should seek a definition of "provision" as public grants and grant equivalents.
- Ask for a separate adaptation grant target, following the Glasgow doubling pledge [4].
- Push MDB reform through the G20 to raise the grant share for vulnerable LDCs.
- Bring workable proposals: India should table draft text that others can negotiate on, so it builds bridges for the Global South and is not seen as blocking the talks.
The Roadmap sets the right scale, but without binding commitments it adds little real money. Required public grant floors and grant-equivalent reporting would make it fair under CBDR-RC and help achieve SDG 13 without leaving the next generation with a climate bill.
Sources
- 1Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T: Report by the Presidencies of CMA 6 and CMA 7, UNFCCC (2025): the US$1.3 trillion by 2035 goal, its Presidencies' authorship and status, and the action fronts on grants and concessional finance and on fiscal space and debt
- 2Paris Agreement (2015), UNFCCC: Article 9.1 "shall provide" versus Article 9.3 mobilisation
- 3OECD press release: Developed countries materially surpassed their USD 100 billion climate finance commitment in 2022 (May 2024): US$115.9 billion in 2022 and the loan share of MDB finance
- 4UNEP Adaptation Gap Report 2025: Running on Empty: adaptation needs of US$310–365 billion against US$26 billion in 2023, the Glasgow pledge off track, and the Roadmap helping only if finance comes as grants and concessional money