·The Hindu·15 marks·250–350 wordsPolityEconomyDefence

High-profile banking frauds point to failures of board-level governance in Indian banks. Analyse, and suggest reforms.

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In this answer
  1. How board governance failed
  2. Beyond the board
  3. Reforms

The board of a bank is its first line of defence for depositors. It approves large loans, checks management and manages conflicts of interest. The ICICI–Videocon loan case, the collapse of Yes Bank and the frauds in public sector banks (PSBs) show this defence failing again and again. The board is not the only point of failure, though.

How board governance failed

  • Deference to the CEO: Boards often approve whatever a dominant MD or CEO wants. In the Kochhar case, the Bombay HC found that ICICI's Board granted sanction to prosecute without examining the CBI's evidence [1].
  • Conflict of interest: Alleged quid-pro-quo lending to the Videocon Group escaped board scrutiny. The Board was later asked to judge its own former CEO, a role the HC said legally belonged to the RBI under Section 36-AA(1), BR Act [1].
  • Weak risk oversight: Yes Bank's finances deteriorated so badly that the RBI superseded its Board in March 2020 and framed a reconstruction scheme [2].
  • Captured PSB boards: The P.J. Nayak Committee (2014) found government control weakened board independence and professionalism in PSBs [3].

Beyond the board

  • Auditors and supervisors also missed early warning signs. Fraud is a failure of the whole system, not of boards alone.
  • Accountability after a fraud is slow because the prior-sanction stage drags on. In Subramanian Swamy (2012) the Supreme Court held that delay in sanction violates due process [4].

Reforms

  • Limit how long top leaders stay: The RBI's 2021 norms cap MD/CEO tenure at 15 years (12 for promoters) and set an age limit of 70 [4]. These rules need to be strictly enforced.
  • Make boards independent: Carry out the Nayak recommendations: board appointments by professional bodies and less government control in PSBs [3].
  • Give risk committees real power: Independent directors should vet large exposures and related-party loans.
  • Make prosecution time-bound: The law should name the RBI as the sanctioning authority with a three-month deadline [1][5].
  • Use technology: Early-warning systems and forensic audits for big-ticket loans.

Board failures sit at the root of most major frauds, but the fix has to cover the whole system: independent boards, a firm regulator and quick accountability. Professional, accountable boards would protect depositors and support the goal of strong institutions under SDG 16.

Sources

  1. 1Bombay HC sets aside ICICI Bank Board of Directors' sanction order on Chanda Kochhar, The Hindu (Nov 2026)Board did not examine CBI evidence; RBI held competent under Section 36-AA(1)
  2. 2RBI Press Release: Draft Scheme of Reconstruction of Yes Bank Ltd (2020)Board supersession and reconstruction scheme
  3. 3RBI: Report of the Committee to Review Governance of Boards of Banks in India (P.J. Nayak, 2014)PSB board independence and appointment reforms
  4. 4RBI Circular: Corporate Governance in Banks – Appointment of Directors and Constitution of Committees of the Board (26 Apr 2021)15/12-year tenure caps, age limit of 70
  5. 5PRS Legislative Research: Requirement of Sanction*Subramanian Swamy* (2012): sanction delay violates due process; three-month limit
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