Compare the constitutional safeguards for judicial tenure and removal in India and Sri Lanka.

Judicial independence rests on two written guarantees — security of tenure and a removal process insulated from the executive. Sri Lanka's September 2026 amendment raising all judges' retirement age by two years [1] makes a comparison with India's scheme directly relevant.

Tenure: constitutionally fixed, unequally insulated

• India writes retirement ages into the Constitution — 65 for Supreme Court judges (Art. 124(2)) and 62 for High Court judges (Art. 217); salaries are charged on the Consolidated Fund, and service conditions cannot be varied to a judge's disadvantage after appointment (Arts. 125, 221) [3].
• Sri Lanka likewise fixes tenure constitutionally, so any change needs a two-thirds majority [2]. Yet a single chamber delivered it: 158 of 225 members extended the tenure of 411 sitting judges [1].
• Common vulnerability: in both, a determined ruling majority can move tenure. India's requirement of a special majority in both Houses is simply a thicker filter than Sri Lanka's unicameral vote.

Removal: same ground, different gatekeepers

• India permits removal only for "proved misbehaviour or incapacity", by an address of both Houses with a special majority, and only after inquiry by a statutory judge-led committee (Arts. 124(4), 217(1)(b)) [3]. No Supreme Court judge has been removed to date.
• Sri Lanka requires an address supported by a majority of the total membership of Parliament, followed by a presidential order (Art. 107) [2] — a lower threshold, with the inquiry conducted by a parliamentary select committee rather than sitting judges.
• The gap showed in the 2013 removal of Chief Justice Shirani Bandaranayake, which a UN official called a "calamitous setback" for the rule of law [4].

Appointments, the third pillar: India's collegium keeps selection within the judiciary; Sri Lanka's President appoints superior court judges subject to approval of the multi-party Constitutional Council [2].

Both constitutions protect judges; India's plural, judge-involved procedures make that protection harder to reverse. Sri Lanka's reform would carry greater legitimacy if tenure changes applied prospectively and were routed through the Constitutional Council — aligning with the rule-of-law commitment both republics share under SDG 16.