Judicial independence requires both security of tenure and freedom from executive influence. Examine with reference to recent judicial reforms in a neighbouring country.

Judicial independence rests on two pillars: tenure a judge cannot lose at another branch's convenience, and insulation from executive reward. Sri Lanka's September 2026 constitutional amendment raising judges' retirement age tests both — and shows that the two can pull against each other.

The reform and its stated case

• Parliament raised the retirement age of all judges by two years, passing the amendment with 158 votes in the 225-seat House; the extension covers 411 sitting judges [1].
• The purpose is genuine: a backlog of 1.1 million cases, with criminal trials usually running over 17 years [1]. Delay is itself a denial of justice.
• Slow courts also weaken contract enforcement — a real cost for an economy still under an IMF Extended Fund Facility programme [2].

Security of tenure — secured or made negotiable?

• Retaining experienced judges avoids part-heard trials restarting, a concrete efficiency gain.
• But tenure altered by a two-thirds majority is tenure held at Parliament's pleasure: a future majority of the same size can shorten it. India's Articles 124(2) and 217 fix retirement at 65 and 62 precisely to place tenure beyond ordinary politics.

Freedom from executive influence — where it strains

• The gain is personal and immediate to judges deciding cases against the government today; the Bar Association and the Opposition, which called it turning the judiciary into a "pawn of the executive", object [1].
• The fear has history: the 2013 removal of Chief Justice Bandaranayake was called a "calamitous setback" for the rule of law by the UN [3].

Efficiency logic is also weak

• Extra years create no extra posts; delayed retirement can block fresh recruitment. India's experience locates delay in empty chairs — 5,146 of 24,018 subordinate-court posts vacant [4] — amid 4.5 crore+ pending cases, 87.6% in subordinate courts [5].

Independence is best served when tenure changes apply prospectively, are routed through an all-party constitutional body rather than the Cabinet, and are paired with the reform's capacity limbs — new courthouses, regional appellate courts and more magistrates [1]. Security of tenure must come by rule, not by grace; only then does efficiency strengthen, rather than quietly purchase, judicial independence.