In the context of the 'weaponisation of critical minerals', critically evaluate India's multi-pronged strategy for critical mineral security.

Critical minerals become weapons when countries that dominate supply restrict exports for political leverage. At the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi (2026), PM Modi warned that such weaponisation threatens shared progress [1]. India has responded with a three-pronged strategy: domestic exploration, overseas acquisition and recycling. The strategy is well designed, but how it is carried out is still uneven.

Strategy and Strengths

• National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM): an outlay of ₹34,300 crore over seven years for exploration, processing, recycling and acquiring mineral assets abroad [2].
• Overseas diversification: buying mineral assets abroad spreads supply across many countries and reduces dependence on any single one [2].
• Recycling ("urban mining"): a ₹1,500 crore incentive scheme offers a 20% capex subsidy plus opex support linked to incremental sales. It pays for real output, not for idle plants [3].
• Industry response: 58 firms have been found eligible, pledging ~850 KTPA of capacity and ~₹5,000 crore of investment [4].
• Diplomacy: the BRICS New Delhi Declaration calls for reliable, diversified and resilient mineral supply chains [5].
• Trade lever: in November 2026, DGFT prohibited exports of lithium-ion black mass so that the feedstock stays with domestic refiners [6].

Weaknesses

• Feedstock deficit: pledged capacity is far above the scheme's target. Yet the informal sector handles ~78% of e-waste. It collects well but processes poorly, so formal plants risk running half-empty [4][7].
• "Paper recycling": NITI Aayog found producers overstating the metal content of their batteries to create false EPR certificates [7]. With 4,022 producers and only 487 recyclers registered, checking real output is hard [8].
• Governance silos: the Ministry of Mines runs the subsidy, while battery EPR sits under the environment rules [3][8].
• Credibility gap: the black-mass ban came soon after the BRICS speech. It can look like the very kind of restriction India criticised [1][6].
• Time lag: recyclers can only recover batteries sold years earlier, while EV demand is rising fast. Recycling is therefore a buffer, not a substitute for imports.

Overall, India has built the right structure: it diversifies sources abroad, explores at home and recycles waste. What it lacks is a steady supply of waste for its plants and a credible system for checking it. The way forward is to audit EPR certificates against each recycler's actual output and to link the EPR portal with the scheme's sales data. Informal collectors should be brought in as registered aggregators through common facility centres [7]. India should also build domestic refining capacity and review the export ban against how much black mass domestic refiners actually absorb. Together these steps would make India's mineral security resilient, consistent with SDG 12 (responsible consumption and production).