"The credibility of the Election Commission rests as much on perception as on performance." Discuss in the light of recent friction between the ECI and the Opposition.

Article 324 gives the Election Commission of India (ECI) the superintendence, direction and control of elections [2]. A referee keeps its authority only if both sides accept its calls. In October 2026, the ECI refused the INDIA bloc's demand to meet the full Commission outside its premises, calling it "unusual" [1]. The standoff shows that following correct procedure does not, on its own, earn credibility.

Performance: the ECI's procedural case

• Institutional autonomy: if MPs could decide where the full Commission must appear, it would look answerable to political pressure [1][2].
• Due process: the ECI says no party asked for an appointment before 4 p.m. It says it learnt of the demand through the media and then the Delhi Police [1].
• Middle path: it offered to send its senior-most officer on duty to the MPs' chosen venue to receive the memorandum, an offer it called "unprecedented" [1].
• Public accountability: by releasing a timeline, it publicly explained its refusal [1].

Perception: why the friction erodes trust

• Optics of refusal: an officer collecting a memorandum looks like a postbox, not a hearing. A correct refusal can still look evasive [1].
• Appointment design: under the 2023 Act, the Selection Committee is the PM, a Cabinet Minister and the LoP. This gives the government a built-in 2:1 majority [2][3].
• Diluted neutrality: in Anoop Baranwal (2023), the Supreme Court put the CJI on the selection panel until Parliament made a law. The Act replaced the CJI with a minister [2].
• Unequal removal protection: Election Commissioners, unlike the CEC, can be removed on the CEC's recommendation [2].
• Voice without veto: the LoP sits on the Selection Committee, yet led an eight-hour dharna and was detained [1][2]. When formal channels give no real say, the street becomes the forum.

Bridging the gap

• Put a neutral member (the CJI) back on the panel, as Law Commission Report No. 255 (2015) proposed [2][4].
• Give Election Commissioners the same removal protection as the CEC, and give the ECI an independent secretariat [2].
• Publish a standard protocol for meeting party delegations, covering notice, venue and when the full Commission meets parties, so that a refusal reads as following a rule rather than taking a side.

This episode shows that performance and perception cannot be separated. A body can be procedurally correct and still lose trust. Neutral appointments, secure tenure and clear rules for engagement would let the ECI be both impartial and visibly impartial. That would strengthen the free and fair elections that Article 324 protects, and the accountable institutions that SDG 16 calls for.