Critically evaluate the role of courts in compelling the executive to set up statutory regulators. Does this amount to judicial overreach?

When Parliament creates a regulator but the executive delays making it work, citizens lose a remedy the law promised. In a PIL, the Kerala High Court told the Centre to make the Data Protection Board (DPB) under the DPDP Act, 2023 functional within eight weeks [1]. This shows courts using Article 226 to close that gap. On balance, it is legitimate activism, though it can slide into overreach.

Case for judicial intervention

• Enforcing a statutory duty: MeitY says the Board is already established under Section 18 [2], and the DPDP Rules were notified in November 2025 [3]. Running the Board is a legal duty, not a policy choice, so a writ of mandamus fits.
• Protecting fundamental rights: The court found passengers' privacy (Article 21) compromised in airport Digi Yatra data processing [1]. Without a working Board, citizens have no forum for complaints, and penalties of up to ₹250 crore go unenforced [3].
• Ending "paper institutions": Pressure from courts narrows the gap between what Parliament intended and what is implemented.

Case for restraint

• Separation of powers: Parliament left the Board's start date to Central Government notification [4], and the Rules chose an 18-month phased rollout [3]. A court timetable overrides that deliberate choice.
• Capacity risk: A regulator rushed into action may start without enough staff or expertise.
• Limits of the remedy: Courts can make the Board work, but they cannot make it independent. Members serve two years with reappointment, against five years for SEBI and CCI. Rojer Mathew (2019) warned that such terms increase executive control [5]. The 2018 draft Bill had a selection panel chaired by the CJI or a Supreme Court judge, but the 2019 Bill shifted the chair to the Cabinet Secretary [6].

Verdict: activism, not overreach

• Parliament decided the what; the court only insists on the when. That is enforcement, not law-making.
• It would become overreach if courts designed the Board's composition, appointed its members or framed its rules.

When courts compel statutory regulators to function, they strengthen the rule of law and Article 21, as long as they enforce duties rather than design institutions. The lasting fix lies with Parliament: it should write tenure and selection into the Act, using the longer fixed-term SEBI–CCI model [5]. That would make judicial nudges unnecessary and respect the separation of powers.