Critically examine the adequacy of the in-house procedure for judicial accountability in India in light of recent controversies.

The in-house procedure, born of full-court resolutions of 1997 and refined in 1999, empowers the Chief Justice of India to receive complaints against judges and constitute a peer committee to inquire into misconduct [2]. Recent controversies show it is a useful but structurally incomplete instrument of accountability.

Strengths of the mechanism

• Fills the impeachment vacuum: removal under Articles 124(4) and 217(1)(b) requires a two-thirds parliamentary majority and has never succeeded; the in-house route allows graded remedial action such as withdrawal of judicial work or advice to resign [1].
• Protects independence through peer review: inquiry is by senior judges, insulating the judiciary from executive or legislative pressure [1].
• Demonstrated responsiveness: in the cash-discovery controversy, a committee was constituted, its findings were forwarded to the President and Prime Minister, and a removal motion followed; the Supreme Court upheld the process, holding the CJI is not a "mere post office" [5].

Limitations exposed by recent events

• No statutory force: it cannot impose punishment, order restitution, or compel evidence — its sanction is essentially moral.
• Resignation as an escape route: resignation under Article 217(1)(a) takes effect on receipt by the President [4], abating proceedings under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 [3], since these lie only against a sitting judge.
• Consequences do not follow findings: pensionary rules do not link entitlement to the manner of exit; the Supreme Court has issued notice on a plea to deny perks to functionaries who resign to avoid removal [6].
• Opacity: reports are not routinely published and complainants have no appeal, weakening public confidence.

The procedure is adequate as a first-response filter but inadequate as a complete accountability system, because its findings can be extinguished by voluntary exit. A statutory framework on the lines of the Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010 — declared standards, a scrutiny panel and an oversight committee [7] — with power to conclude inquiries and attach consequences post-resignation, would align judicial accountability with the constitutional promise of probity without diluting judicial independence.