"Resignation should not become an escape route from constitutional accountability." Discuss with reference to the mechanism for removal of judges under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, and suggest reforms.

The Constitution secures judicial independence by making removal deliberately difficult under Article 124(4) (read with Article 217 for High Court judges). Yet Article 217(1)(a) allows a judge to resign to the President with immediate effect — an exit that can extinguish accountability proceedings while leaving retiral benefits intact.

The statutory mechanism and where it breaks down

• The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 requires a removal motion signed by 100 Lok Sabha or 50 Rajya Sabha members, admission by the Speaker/Chairman, investigation by a three-member committee, and finally a special majority address in both Houses [1].
• The process is office-specific: once the judge demits office, the address to the President becomes infructuous. No Indian judge has ever been removed, despite repeated attempts.
• The Justice Yashwant Varma episode illustrates this. Cash was discovered at his official Delhi residence in March 2025, prompting an SC in-house inquiry [2]; his challenge to its findings was dismissed [3]. His subsequent resignation, while a removal motion moved by 146 MPs was pending, halted the constitutional process midway.

Why resignation becomes an escape route

• Resignation needs no acceptance and is effective on receipt — accountability yields to a unilateral act.
• Pension and service rules do not link entitlement to the manner of exit; the Supreme Court has issued notice to the Centre on a plea seeking denial of perks to functionaries who quit to avoid inquiry [4].
• Ethically, it converts a sanction into a soft landing, weakening probity and public trust in institutions.

Reforms

• Amend the 1968 Act so an inquiry survives resignation and records findings, with due process preserved.
• Link pensionary benefits to proved misbehaviour, not to resignation itself.
• Give statutory backing to the 1999 in-house procedure with graded sanctions, extending the principle to other constitutional functionaries.

Accountability and independence are complements, not rivals: an inquiry that concludes on merits protects the honest judge as much as it exposes the errant one. Reforming exit rules, rather than diluting security of tenure, would ensure that resignation closes a tenure without closing the question of conduct.