Critically examine whether the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners Act, 2023 strengthens or weakens the institutional autonomy of the ECI.

Article 324 makes the ECI responsible for elections. However, Parliament passed no law on how its members are appointed until the CEC and Other ECs Act, 2023. The Act replaced the interim panel set up in Anoop Baranwal (2023), which had the PM, the LoP and the CJI [1][3]. The Act gives the Commission a legal framework, but on balance it shifts control of appointments to the executive.

How the Act strengthens autonomy

• Statutory process: A Search Committee shortlists five names and a Selection Committee recommends one. This replaces appointment by executive discretion alone [1][2].
• Fixed tenure: Members serve six years or until age 65, with no reappointment. This reduces the incentive to please the government [1].
• Status protected: The Bill had tied pay to the Cabinet Secretary's. After objections, it was raised to equal a Supreme Court judge's salary, which keeps pay out of executive control [1][2].
• Collegial design: The CEC and the ECs have equal say in decisions [1].
• Functional shield: A new clause bars civil and criminal cases over acts done in official duty [2].

How the Act weakens autonomy

• Executive majority: The panel has the PM, a Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM and the LoP. That gives the government a 2:1 majority, and the CJI is left out [1][3].
• Vacancy clause: Appointments stay valid even if a panel seat is empty. If the LoP post is vacant, only government members choose [1].
• Porous shortlist: The Search Committee is headed by the Law Minister, and the panel can pick people outside its list [1][2].
• Unequal tenure security: ECs can be removed on the CEC's recommendation (Section 11) [3]. The SC has said only Parliament can give them equal protection [1]. This leaves dissenting ECs exposed, as the reported objections during the 2026 SIR row showed.
• Accountability gap: The broad immunity clause, together with judge-like removal protection, makes it hard to hold a CEC accountable [2].
• Reform advice ignored: The Goswami Committee (1990) and the Law Commission's 255th Report (2015) both proposed a panel that included the CJI [1][4].

On balance, the Act gives the ECI legal footing and judge-level status but leaves selection under executive control. The way forward is to:

• adopt a neutral panel that includes the CJI, as the Law Commission advised [4];
• amend Article 324(5) to give ECs the same removal protection as the CEC;
• keep minutes that record dissent.

These steps would protect free and fair elections, which are part of the Constitution's basic structure.