"Defence diplomacy through ASEAN-led mechanisms has become a key instrument of India's Act East Policy." Discuss with reference to the ADMM-Plus.

Defence diplomacy means using military dialogue, exercises and capacity-building to serve foreign-policy goals. It gives India's Act East Policy a security dimension alongside trade and connectivity [9]. The ADMM-Plus (10 ASEAN members + 8 Dialogue Partners, meeting annually since 2017) is the main ASEAN-led platform where this happens [2].

ADMM-Plus as an instrument of Act East

• Sustained institutional leadership: India co-chaired Experts' Working Groups (EWGs) on Humanitarian Mine Action (with Vietnam, 2014–17), Military Medicine (with Myanmar, 2017–20) and HADR (with Indonesia) [3]. It now co-chairs the Counter-Terrorism EWG with Malaysia (2024–27) [4].
• Operational interoperability: a CT Table-Top Exercise in Malaysia (2026) and a Field Training Exercise in India (2027) turn dialogue into joint capability [4].
• Security-provider image: at the 13th ADMM-Plus in Cebu, India offered its "battle-tested" CT expertise through joint exercises, capacity-building and intelligence sharing [1].
• Normative voice: India backs freedom of navigation, overflight and lawful commerce [6] and says this stance is "not against any country" [7]. This supports ASEAN centrality while quietly hedging against coercion.
• Bilateral spin-offs: the India–Malaysia Joint Statement welcomed the CT co-chairmanship [5]. The proposed "Youth Bridge" adds a people-to-people element [1].
• New threats: the Defence Secretary flagged terrorists' use of advanced technology as a reason for action-oriented cooperation [8].

Limitations

• Consensus forum: the US, China and Russia sit at the same table [2]. India spoke of "state-sponsored terror" without naming Pakistan [1], so the forum cannot deliver a collective condemnation.
• Rotation, not reward: each EWG is co-chaired by one ASEAN state and one partner on a three-year rotation [2]. Influence has to be earned through what India delivers.
• Threat mismatch: India's experience comes mainly from cross-border terrorism [1], while many ASEAN states face home-grown extremism. ASEAN's non-interference norm also limits intelligence sharing.
• Soft outcomes: the outputs are exercises and declarations, not binding commitments.

The ADMM-Plus has therefore moved Act East beyond trade into a practical security partnership, though consensus politics limits how far it can go. India should build the 2027 exercise around ASEAN's own threats and connect CT work with cyber security, one of the forum's seven areas of cooperation [2]. Doing so, in the spirit of MAHASAGAR [7] and ASEAN centrality, would make India a trusted partner for a rules-based Indo-Pacific, in line with SDG 16.