"Terrorism knows no borders." In this light, assess whether regional multilateral frameworks are effective in countering state-sponsored terrorism.

At the 13th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) in Cebu in October 2026, India offered ASEAN partners its "battle-tested" counter-terrorism (CT) experience, arguing that terrorism knows no borders [1]. Regional frameworks work well against terror networks that operate across borders. They work only partly against terrorism that a state sponsors.

Where regional frameworks are effective

• Common legal rules: the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism (ACCT) is ASEAN's main shared framework [4]. It shows that states with very different political systems can agree on regional rules even before the UN agrees on a definition of terrorism.
• Working together in practice: the ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group on CT is co-chaired by India and Malaysia (2024–27). It is moving from meetings to a Table-Top Exercise in Malaysia in 2026 [2].
• Training and intelligence sharing: India offered joint exercises, capacity-building and intelligence sharing [1]. These target the link between terrorism and transnational crime that ASEAN itself highlights [4].
• New threats: the Defence Secretary warned that terrorists now use advanced technology. He said this needs a joint, action-oriented response [2].

Where they fall short against state sponsorship

• Consensus and non-interference: the ADMM-Plus brings the US, China and Russia to one table. India spoke of "state-sponsored terror" there but did not name Pakistan [1]. Regional forums rarely condemn a particular state.
• No agreed definition: in 2022, speakers at the UN General Assembly's Sixth Committee were still calling for a clear definition of terrorism and an agreed comprehensive convention (CCIT) [5]. When states split terrorists into "good" and "bad", intelligence stops flowing.
• Different threats: ASEAN focuses on domestic CT laws and the terror–crime link [4], not on attacks backed by a hostile state. A strike-based model such as Operation Sindoor is hard to transfer to ASEAN [1].
• No enforcement power: after Operation Sindoor, India's diplomatic support came mainly from major powers and individual partners such as the US, UK, UAE and Japan, not from regional bodies [3].

Regional frameworks are good at building shared skills against cross-border networks, but they lack the political will to isolate state sponsors. Linking ADMM-Plus exercises to global pressure tools, such as FATF scrutiny, UN sanctions listings and adoption of the CCIT, can close this gap. In line with SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions), combining regional and global action is the most credible response to terrorism that crosses borders.