Defence diplomacy through joint exercises has become a key instrument of India's foreign policy. Examine with reference to India–Russia naval engagement.

Defence diplomacy means using military contacts to serve foreign-policy goals. The naval Exercise INDRA 2026 at Vladivostok (13–18 Oct) is officially framed under India's MAHASAGAR vision and as a follow-up to the 23rd India–Russia Annual Summit [1]. This shows that exercises now carry diplomatic weight beyond tactical drills.

Exercises as a foreign-policy instrument

• Signalling continuity: INDRA keeps the "Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership" (2010) active at a time of shifting global alignments [2].
• Strategic reach: Sending INS Sahyadri to the North-West Pacific shows Indian naval presence beyond the Indian Ocean [1].
• Institutional anchoring: Exercises feed into the Annual Summit, the 2+2 dialogue and the IRIGC-M&MTC mechanism [2].
• Soft power: The harbour phase includes cultural and people-to-people interactions [1].

Operational and economic payoffs

• Interoperability: Most Indian submarines and frigates such as INS Tushil and INS Tamal are of Russian origin, so joint drills have practical value [2].
• Alternating venues: The exercise moved from Chennai and the Bay of Bengal in 2025 to Vladivostok in 2026, which spreads the costs and familiarises each navy with the other's waters [1][2].
• Connectivity: The Vladivostok venue supports the Chennai–Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor. This route of about 5,600 nautical miles cuts cargo time from 40 days to 24 [3].

Limitations

• Dependence: The Estimates Committee (2018) warned that foreign suppliers may withhold spares in emergencies [4]. The Ukraine war makes this risk sharper.
• Opportunity cost: The Navy is short of reconnaissance aircraft, and Project-75 submarines came about seven years late [4]. A far-Pacific deployment uses up scarce ship-days.
• Thin economic base: In FY 2024-25 India imported USD 63.8 bn from Russia but exported only USD 4.9 bn [2]. This keeps the corridor a mostly one-way bulk route [3].

Way forward

• Bring Russian-origin spares under the Positive Indigenisation Lists, which already cover 5,012 items [4].
• Extend co-production models such as BrahMos and the AK-203 [2].
• Secure long-term container-cargo commitments for the corridor [3].

INDRA shows that joint exercises have become an important tool of India's diplomacy, but they cannot work alone. They deliver lasting value only when backed by indigenisation, co-production and balanced trade. Linked to these, naval engagement with Russia can turn port calls into a durable partnership that serves strategic autonomy and MAHASAGAR's goal of "security and growth across regions".