The India–Russia relationship is evolving from a buyer–seller relationship to co-development. Critically analyse in the context of India's strategic autonomy.

In December 2010, India and Russia raised their ties to a "Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership" [1]. Since then, defence ties have moved from buying ready-made equipment towards joint design and production. The shift is real but incomplete. Building weapons at home gives India more strategic autonomy, but its dependence on older Russian equipment still limits that autonomy.

Evidence of the shift to co-development

• Institutional basis: the Military-Technical Cooperation Agreement 2021–2031 covers joint R&D, production and after-sales support [1].
• Joint ventures: BrahMos (DRDO–NPOM); AK-203 rifles made by Indo-Russia Rifles at Korwa [1].
• Licensed production: Su-30MKI by HAL; T-90S Bhishma tanks [1].
• Operational trust: naval INDRA 2026 at Vladivostok builds interoperability [2]. This matters because most Indian submarines are of Russian origin [1].

Limits of the shift

• Outright purchases continue: S-400 was procured, not co-produced. Frigates INS Tushil and INS Tamal were built in Russia and commissioned at Kaliningrad [1].
• Spares vulnerability: the Estimates Committee (2018) warned that foreign suppliers may withhold weapons or spares in an emergency [3]. The Standing Committee on Defence (Dec 2024) noted that geopolitical shifts can disrupt buying through traditional allies [3]. The Ukraine war makes this risk sharper.
• Lopsided economics: in FY 2024-25, India imported USD 63.8 bn from Russia but exported only USD 4.9 bn [1].

Implications for strategic autonomy

• Gains: in 2023-24 and 2024-25 (up to September 2024), only 6 of 271 capital acquisition contracts went to foreign vendors, from Russia and the USA [3]. India is spreading its sources and building domestic capacity rather than relying on one supplier.
• Constraints: India was the world's largest arms importer in 2013–2023, with about 10% of global arms imports. About 28% of modernisation spending still went abroad in 2023-24 [3]. Ships and submarines already in service will need Russian support for decades.

Overall, co-development has changed the form of the partnership more than its underlying dependence. The way forward is to make spares for Russian-origin platforms in India through the Positive Indigenisation Lists (5,012 items) [3]. India should also strictly apply the DAP 2020 rule of at least 50% Indian content to refit contracts [3]. Shifting from buying to building with Russia, in line with Atmanirbhar Bharat, gives India strategic autonomy that rests on its own capacity rather than on goodwill.