Dependence on foreign-controlled technology platforms is a strategic vulnerability. Examine with reference to satellite navigation and satcom services in India.

Relying on foreign technology becomes a strategic weakness when an outside entity can switch off, block or degrade a service the country's security depends on. SpaceX reportedly throttled its military-grade Starshield network in Ukraine, which shows that even a private company can do this [1]. India is exposed in the same way.

Satellite navigation: an incomplete hedge

• Risk of denial: foreign defence agencies run GPS and GLONASS, and they can degrade or deny civilian signals. ISRO built NavIC to end this dependence. It includes an encrypted Restricted Service for strategic users [2].
• Too few satellites: only three satellites work, but standalone positioning needs four. Only the timing service still works [3]. Users fall back on US-controlled GPS, which defeats NavIC's purpose.
• Foreign components: NavIC receivers have used Qualcomm (USA) and MediaTek chipsets [4].

Satcom: the operator controls the satellites

• Operator discretion: in Ukraine a company, not a government, throttled a security network [1].
• Limits of licence conditions: since May 2025, the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) has required that all traffic pass through Indian gateways, that 20% of ground equipment be made in India within five years, and that user terminals use NavIC by 2029 [5]. These rules control where data flows, but the satellites are still commanded from abroad.
• Cautious entry: Starlink, OneWeb and Jio-SES hold GMPCS licences, but each must pass a security assessment before it gets spectrum [6]. The cost of this caution is slower rural broadband.

The other side

• The armed forces use several navigation systems, including NavIC, so losing one does not cripple them [3].
• Foreign operators have acted lawfully in India so far [1].

Way forward

• ISRO: keep spare satellites ready. NVS-03 is ready to launch and NVS-04/05 are being built [3].
• MeitY: scale up the Made-in-India NavIC chips [4], and require NavIC in phones once enough satellites are working again.
• DoT/MHA: license several satcom providers and plan an Indian backup network for security users.

India's real exposure lies less in using foreign platforms than in having no ready alternative when one fails. Self-reliance therefore means backups and choice, not isolation. Indigenous satellites, Indian chips and several satcom providers would protect India's strategic autonomy and build the resilient infrastructure that SDG 9 calls for.