Did the CEC and Other ECs Act, 2023 dilute the spirit of *Anoop Baranwal*? Critically examine its implications for the independence of the Election Commission.

Article 324(2) leaves the appointment of the CEC and ECs to a law made by Parliament. Anoop Baranwal (2023) filled the gap with a PM–LoP–CJI panel [1]. The 2023 Act replaced the CJI with a Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM [2]. It follows the letter of the judgment but dilutes its spirit.

Letter vs spirit of Baranwal

• Letter kept: the panel was a pro-tem measure that would hold "till a law is made". The Court also said it would not ask Parliament to legislate in a particular way [2].
• Spirit diluted: the Court held that appointments must not rest with the Executive alone [1]. Under the Act, the PM and the PM's nominee (the Home Minister in 2024 [2]) form a 2:1 majority [1].

Implications: threats to independence

• Pre-election vacancy: appointments stay valid even if a seat on the panel is vacant. Only the LoP seat can fall vacant, when the Lok Sabha is dissolved, so the panel may be wholly ruling-party just before polls [1].
• Executive at both stages: in 2024 the MoS (Law) chaired the Search Committee, with two Secretaries as members [2]. The Selection Committee can also choose outside the shortlist [1].
• Opaque procedure: in March 2024 the shortlist was given to the LoP only on the day of selection. The SC expressed concern [2].
• Narrow pool: only Secretary-rank officers are eligible, even though the ECI does quasi-judicial work such as disqualification cases and symbol disputes [1].
• Gaps left open: ECs can still be removed on the CEC's recommendation. There is still no independent secretariat, despite proposals from the Goswami Committee (1990) and the ECI (2018) [1].

Implications: mitigating factors

• Parliament's mandate: the Constituent Assembly deliberately left the method to Parliament [1].
• Precedent: the CIC and CVC are chosen by similar panels. However, the SC places the ECI on a "higher pedestal" [1].
• Safeguards remain: the opposition keeps a seat. Judicial review can strike down the law if it violates fundamental rights [2]. A multi-member ECI also provides "balance and check" (T.N. Seshan) [2].

Overall, the Act is constitutionally permissible, but it tilts selection towards the government and weakens how neutral the ECI is seen to be. The way forward is a panel with no built-in government majority, on the Law Commission (2015) or NCRWC (2002) models [1]. This should come with a bar on appointments while the LoP seat is vacant, equal removal protection for ECs through a constitutional amendment, and an independent secretariat. These steps would honour Ambedkar's view that the election machinery must stay out of the government's control [1]. They would also protect free and fair elections, which are part of the Constitution's basic structure.