The differential removal protection for the CEC and Election Commissioners weakens the ECI's collegial character. Comment.

Under the proviso to Article 324(5), the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) can be removed only in the way a Supreme Court judge is removed. That requires a Presidential order after a special-majority motion in both Houses [2]. Election Commissioners (ECs) can be removed simply on the CEC's recommendation [2]. The 2023 Act kept this gap, and it largely turns a body of equals into a Chief with subordinates.

How the asymmetry weakens collegiality

• Dissent becomes risky: An EC who disagrees with the CEC can be removed on that same CEC's recommendation. No motion or inquiry is needed [2].
• Current example: ECs Sandhu and Joshi reportedly recorded objections at least 14 times in 10 months [4]. Each time, they were overruled by the officer who could start their removal.
• The check fails: A three-member Commission exists so that members can check one another. With unequal security, the Commission tends to follow the CEC.
• Appointments make it worse: The Selection Committee has 2 of 3 members from the government side [1]. So ECs have neither independent selection nor secure tenure.
• Parliament did not act: In Anoop Baranwal (2023), the Supreme Court said protecting ECs "is a matter for Parliament to consider" [3]. Parliament passed the 2023 Act in December 2023 [1] but kept the gap [2].

Counterview

• The Constitution itself sets out different removal procedures, so the Court could not order parity [3]. The CEC's recommendation also means the executive cannot remove an EC on its own [2].
• Recorded dissent shows that ECs do speak freely. Disagreement is not "proved misbehaviour", and the Opposition's removal motion lacks the special majority, so it is mainly a political signal [2][4].

Way forward

• Equal removal protection for ECs through a constitutional amendment.
• An independent ECI secretariat, as the Goswami Committee recommended [3].
• Recorded reasons whenever the Commission's decision goes against a member's dissent.
• A balanced selection panel with a non-government member.

In short, unequal tenure security, together with appointments controlled by the executive, weakens the ECI's collegial character, although it does not destroy it. Equal protection, institutional autonomy and transparent decision-making would restore a true multi-member Commission. That matters for free and fair elections, which are part of the Constitution's basic structure.