"The security of tenure of the Chief Election Commissioner is necessary but not sufficient for the independence of the Election Commission." Critically examine in light of the 2023 Act.

Under the Article 324(5) proviso, the CEC can be removed only in the manner of, and on the grounds for, a Supreme Court judge. The CEC and Other ECs Act, 2023 keeps this safeguard [2]. The shield is essential, but the 2023 Act shows that independence also depends on who is appointed, how colleagues are protected, and whether the Commission is institutionally autonomous.

Why security of tenure is necessary

• High bar for removal: a Presidential order after a motion passed by both Houses in the same session, by a special majority [2]. No government can remove the CEC on its own.
• Fixed tenure: 6 years or age 65, whichever comes first, with no reappointment [2]. This removes any reason to seek favour from the executive.
• Freedom to act: the CEC can enforce the Model Code against ruling parties without fear of losing the post.

Why it is not sufficient: gaps in the 2023 Act

• Appointment tilt: the Selection Committee of the PM, a Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM and the LoP replaced the Anoop Baranwal interim panel, which included the CJI [1][3]. With 2 of 3 votes, the government can choose who gets the protection, so tenure may end up shielding a friendly appointee.
• LoP vacancy: when Lok Sabha is dissolved before an election, only government members remain on the panel [3].
• Narrow pool: only serving or former Secretary-rank officers can be chosen, even though the ECI does quasi-judicial work [3].
• Unequal protection for ECs: an EC can be removed on the CEC's recommendation alone [2]. Baranwal left equal protection "for Parliament to consider", and the Act did not provide it [3]. Two ECs reportedly recorded objections at least 14 times in 10 months [4], which makes this a live risk to collegial functioning.
• No independent secretariat, although the Goswami Committee recommended one [3].

The other side

• Parliament used its Art. 324(2) power to legislate, and Baranwal's panel was meant only as a stop-gap until it did [3].
• The Opposition keeps a seat on the panel [1].

Way forward

• Give ECs the same removal protection as the CEC.
• Add a neutral member to the Selection Committee (South Africa and the UK include non-government members) [3].
• Create an independent secretariat and name a substitute when the LoP post is vacant.

Security of tenure protects the officeholder, but fair appointment, equal protection for colleagues and institutional autonomy protect the institution. Reforming all three together would secure free and fair elections, which are part of the basic structure, and fulfil the Constitution's vision of a fearless ECI.