[Discuss the constitutional and administrative challenges in reforming the collegium system of judicial appointments in India. Was the NJAC a viable alternative? (250 words)](/upsc-mains-answer/discuss-constitutional-administrative-challenges-reforming-c-6615046)

The collegium — the CJI-led body that recommends judges to the Supreme Court and High Courts under Articles 124 and 217 — is a judicial creation evolved through the three Judges Cases, not a constitutional or statutory body [1]. Reforming it is difficult because judicial primacy in appointments has itself been read into the basic structure, leaving little room for legislative redesign.

Constitutional challenges

• Judicial primacy as basic structure: in the Second Judges Case (1993) and Third Judges Case (1998), the word "consultation" in Article 124 was read as the binding collective opinion of the CJI and senior-most judges, converting an executive power into a judicial one [1].
• Limits on Parliament: the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act and NJAC Act, 2014 were struck down in 2015 for failing to secure judicial primacy, so any reform must survive the same basic-structure test [2][3].
• Independence versus accountability: separation of powers is invoked to resist executive participation, while the judiciary remains outside comparable accountability mechanisms.

Administrative challenges

• Opacity of process: no published eligibility criteria, no advertised vacancies, and resolutions issued largely without reasons [4].
• Unfinished Memorandum of Procedure: the SC directed a revised MoP in 2015 to build in transparency and secretariat support; a version was finalised but never notified, leaving the operating manual unsettled [3].
• Delay and vacancies: absence of binding timelines between collegium recommendation and government notification sustains high pending vacancies in the High Courts [5].

Was the NJAC viable? Partly. Its design merit lay in institutionalising the process — a statutory body, defined procedure and lay participation. But the veto available to any two members, coupled with an undefined basis for selecting "eminent persons", risked executive influence over the judiciary's own composition [2].

The real deficit is not who appoints, but how visibly. A notified MoP with published criteria, declared vacancies, reasoned resolutions and fixed timelines — a course the Law Commission's 214th Report anticipated [6] — can deliver accountability without diluting independence, honouring both judicial primacy and the constitutional promise of transparent governance.