Discuss the constitutional and administrative challenges in reforming the collegium system of judicial appointments in India. Was the NJAC a viable alternative?

The collegium is a judicial creation, built by reinterpreting the word "consultation" in Articles 124 and 217 through the Second (1993) and Third (1998) Judges Cases; it appears nowhere in the constitutional text [4]. Reforming it has proved difficult less because of drafting problems than because of the doctrinal and procedural walls around it.

Constitutional challenges

• Basic structure barrier: the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, 2014 was passed by both Houses and ratified by states [1], yet was struck down in 2015 for diluting judicial primacy, an element of judicial independence held to be part of the basic structure [4]. The amendment route is therefore effectively narrowed.
• Separation of powers dilemma: executive-inclusive models attract the charge of political interference, while pure judicial self-selection leaves independence without accountability — no constitutional mechanism reconciles the two.
• Absence of statutory footing: since the collegium rests on case law, Parliament cannot refine it by ordinary legislation.

Administrative challenges

• MoP deadlock: the revised Memorandum of Procedure, meant to build in transparency, remains unsettled; the Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice (2016) attributed appointment delays to the lack of executive–judiciary consensus on it [3].
• Opacity of process: eligibility criteria, selection methodology, candidate pools and vacancy numbers are unpublished, and rejected candidates receive no reasons — the Committee urged disclosure on all these counts as a matter of natural justice [3].
• Timelines ignored: deadlines fixed in the Second Judges Case are routinely missed, leaving High Court vacancies unfilled [3].

Was the NJAC viable? Its intent was sound — a broad-based, statutory body appointing on "ability, merit and other criteria" [2]. Its design was not: any two members could veto a name [2], letting non-judicial members block appointments, while "eminent persons" were left undefined by criteria or tenure safeguards.

The real gap is procedural, not structural. A collegium equipped with a permanent secretariat, published criteria and reasoned resolutions, anchored in a finalised MoP, can deliver the transparency the NJAC promised without disturbing judicial independence — accountability and independence reinforcing, rather than displacing, each other.