Discuss the efficacy of the Anti-Defection Law in curbing political instability, citing recent instances of selective disqualification proceedings by Assembly Speakers.

The Tenth Schedule, inserted by the 52nd Amendment Act, 1985, penalises legislators who voluntarily give up party membership or defy the party whip [1]. Four decades on, it has stabilised governments in form, but Speaker-driven adjudication has diluted its spirit.

Where the law has worked

• Deterrence of retail defection: individual floor-crossing for office is now costly; the 2003 (91st Amendment) deletion of the one-third split clause, retaining only two-thirds merger, closed the main escape route [1].
• Party discipline in floor tests: whips make confidence votes predictable, as in Tamil Nadu's May 2026 trust vote, won 144–22 with 5 abstentions [4].
• Judicially anchored: Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) upheld the Schedule while subjecting the Speaker's order to judicial review, providing a corrective [2].

Where efficacy breaks down

• Selective proceedings: of 25 AIADMK MLAs who defied the whip in the 2026 confidence vote, 21 were condoned by the party and action dropped, while proceedings continued only against the four who resigned and joined the ruling TVK — hearings were still at the explanation stage in July 2026 [4].
• Delay as de facto acquittal: Tamil Nadu's earlier disqualification petitions of 2017 dragged on for years, letting a House's arithmetic settle before any ruling [4].
• Partisan adjudicator: the Speaker remains a ruling-party legislator deciding on their own majority; the 1987 AIADMK case, where 27 MLAs were disqualified mid-motion, set the template [1].
• Chilling of debate: the whip converts every vote into a loyalty test, weakening the legislator's deliberative role — the Law Commission's 170th Report (1999) found the Schedule's working marked by abuse [3].

The law curbs numerical instability but not the ethical instability of party-hopping, because enforcement is discretionary. Shifting adjudication to an independent authority, prescribing a time-bound decision, and confining the whip to money bills and confidence motions would restore the Schedule's purpose — genuine representation over engineered majorities.