"The Speaker's role as adjudicator under the Tenth Schedule undermines the very idea of separation of powers." Critically examine in light of recent state-level disqualification controversies.

The Tenth Schedule, inserted by the 52nd Amendment Act, 1985, makes the Speaker the sole adjudicator of defection petitions [1] — placing a judicial function inside a legislative office held by a partisan member. Recent state controversies show the design strains, though not fatally, the separation-of-powers scheme.

How the arrangement weakens separation of powers

• Judge in own cause: the Speaker remains a party member de facto, so disqualification outcomes can track the ruling party's survival needs rather than law; the Supreme Court itself flagged this in Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020) [3].
• Delay as a political tool: the Schedule fixes no time limit, so petitions can outlive the House [1]. Tamil Nadu's earlier O. Panneerselvam-era petitions dragged for years; the Court had to prescribe a three-month norm [3].
• Selective adjudication: in the 2026 Tamil Nadu case, of 25 AIADMK MLAs who defied the whip in the confidence vote, 21 were condoned while proceedings continued against the four who joined the ruling TVK — inviting charges of convenience over consistency [5].
• Executive capture of a legislative office: outcomes shape government stability, blurring legislature–executive lines.

The case for retaining the Speaker

• House autonomy: membership questions are internal discipline; routine judicial entry would breach Article 122/212 immunity of proceedings.
• Judicial review already checks abuse: Kihoto Hollohan (1992) struck down Para 7's finality clause, subjecting the Speaker's order to review on malafides and perversity [2] — so no unreviewable power survives.
• Procedural fairness is possible: the Tamil Nadu Speaker's staggered individual hearings for the petitioner and respondents show quasi-judicial form being observed [5].

The defect lies less in the location of the power than in the absence of neutrality and deadlines. The Law Commission's 170th Report proposed vesting adjudication in the President/Governor acting on the Election Commission's advice [4]; coupling such an independent tribunal with the three-month limit [3] would preserve House autonomy while restoring the impartiality that Articles 14 and 21 demand of any adjudicator.