Discuss the implications of the lack of public disclosure of the PSLV Failure Analysis Committee report on accountability and public trust in autonomous scientific institutions.

Q. Discuss the implications of the lack of public disclosure of the PSLV Failure Analysis Committee report on accountability and public trust in autonomous scientific institutions. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Section 4 of the RTI Act, 2005 makes proactive disclosure the default duty of every public authority [3]. Yet ISRO's Failure Analysis Committee (FAC) report on the PSLV-C61 failure was submitted to the PMO without public release [1] — an opacity whose cost became visible when PSLV-C62 failed in the same third stage [2].

Implications for accountability - Closed verification loop: the assurance of corrective "structural reinforcements" before C62 came from the same agency that built the stage; no independent technical body validated it, and the repeat PS3 anomaly — a roll-rate deviation just before stage separation — went unanticipated [2]. - Weak statutory anchoring: disclosure became discretionary rather than a Section 4 obligation [3], and India lacks any parliamentary or independent mishap-review mechanism for space missions. - Commercial accountability gap: customers who lost payloads on a mission marketed by NSIL, a wholly government-owned company under the Department of Space [5], cannot examine the causal chain that determines liability and insurance pricing. - Diluted institutional learning: industry partners now producing a large share of PSLV hardware need published root-cause findings to correct their own quality systems.

Implications for public trust - Reversal of an institutional norm: ISRO's standing was built on candid post-failure explanation; silence over its "workhorse" launcher reads as defensiveness. - Speculation fills the vacuum: unexplained consecutive failures invite conjecture about the production handover to industry — conjecture that evidence could have settled. - Strategic credibility: the Indian Space Policy 2023 positions India as a competitive, trusted provider of launch services [4]; international customers price reliability on verifiable failure analysis, not assurances. - Taxpayer legitimacy: continued funding of autonomous scientific bodies rests on demonstrated self-correction.

Non-disclosure thus converts a technical setback into a governance one, eroding both external scrutiny and hard-earned goodwill. Publishing redacted FAC reports, instituting an independent mission-assurance audit, and periodic parliamentary review would align the space programme with the RTI Act's transparency mandate [3] and strengthen, rather than diminish, India's credibility as a spacefaring nation.

(~325 words)

Sources: 1. ISRO forms probe panel after PSLV-C61 glitch leaves EOS-09 off target — News on AIR (Prasar Bharati, GoI) — FAC constituted after C61 third-stage failure; report routed to the PMO 2. PSLV-C62 anomaly: ISRO investigates roll disturbance during third stage — News on AIR (Prasar Bharati, GoI) — repeat PS3 failure, roll-rate deviation before stage separation 3. The Right to Information Act, 2005 (Section 4, suo motu disclosure) — rti.gov.in — statutory duty of proactive disclosure by public authorities 4. Indian Space Policy 2023 — Department of Space/ISRO — commercialisation framework and India's positioning as a provider of launch services 5. NewSpace India Limited incorporated as new commercial arm of Department of Space — PIB — NSIL's status as a wholly government-owned company under DoS