Two consecutive failures of PSLV in 2025–26 have exposed systemic weaknesses in ISRO's quality assurance framework. Critically examine the causes and suggest a governance reform agenda for India's space programme.

Q. Two consecutive failures of PSLV in 2025–26 have exposed systemic weaknesses in ISRO's quality assurance framework. Critically examine the causes and suggest a governance reform agenda for India's space programme. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

The PSLV, ISRO's "workhorse" with a historically high success rate across more than sixty flights, lost EOS-09 in PSLV-C61 (May 2025) [1] and a 16-satellite rideshare in PSLV-C62 (January 2026). Both failures struck the third stage (PS3) — a repetition that shifts the issue from isolated anomaly to systemic assurance.

Technical causes - C61 failed due to a chamber pressure drop in the solid PS3 motor, with the flex-nozzle control system under suspicion [2]. - C62 saw a roll-rate disturbance near PS3 separation, causing trajectory deviation [3]. - A common subsystem failing twice points to manufacturing-level defects — propellant grain, nozzle erosion or igniter quality — rather than random chance.

Institutional and governance causes - Productionisation transition: regular PSLV manufacture has moved to an HAL–L&T consortium, with ISRO retaining only mission analysis and configuration control [4] — a shift demanding new supply-chain audit systems still stabilising. - Transparency deficit: the C61 Failure Analysis Committee report went to the PMO without public release; return-to-flight rested on internal assurances that C62 then disproved. - No independent or parliamentary mishap-review mechanism exists, unlike NASA's public investigation culture.

A balanced view Anomalies are inherent to solid-motor flight, and India's core launch competence — Chandrayaan, Gaganyaan development, PSLV's record — remains sound. The weakness lies in assurance and disclosure processes, not in scientific capability. Yet commercially the cost is real: rising insurance premiums and lost credibility undercut the "net provider of space services" ambition of the Indian Space Policy 2023 [5].

Reform agenda - Mandatory public disclosure of failure analysis reports, with redaction only for strategic payloads. - An independent mission assurance board, outside the project chain, clearing return-to-flight. - Stage-level acceptance testing and traceability audits across the industry consortium. - Strengthened IN-SPACe–NSIL oversight of quality norms for private manufacturers.

Reliability, not launch frequency, is the true currency of the commercial space market. Institutionalising transparent failure analysis and independent assurance would convert this setback into durable credibility, advancing the Indian Space Policy 2023 vision of a globally competitive Indian space economy.

(~330 words)

Sources: 1. ISRO — PSLV-C61/EOS-09 Mission — mission profile and loss of EOS-09 2. ISRO forms probe panel after PSLV-C61 glitch leaves EOS-09 off target — News on AIR (Prasar Bharati) — PS3 chamber pressure drop; failure committee constituted 3. PSLV-C62 anomaly: ISRO investigates roll disturbance during third stage — News on AIR (Prasar Bharati) — roll-rate disturbance near PS3; Chairman's statement 4. ISRO — PSLV Productionisation — transfer of PSLV production to the HAL–L&T industry consortium 5. Indian Space Policy – 2023, Department of Space — commercialisation framework and roles of NSIL/IN-SPACe