Discuss the relationship between Article 129 and the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Does the statute limit the inherent powers of the Supreme Court?

Article 129 makes the Supreme Court a court of record, with the power "to punish for contempt of itself". Parliament later passed the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, "to define and limit" contempt powers [1]. Its competence for this comes from Entry 77 of the Union List. The two work together, but the power comes from the Constitution and not from the Act.

Relationship between Article 129 and the 1971 Act

• Source vs procedure: Article 129 gives the Court an inherent power. The Act defines civil and criminal contempt (Section 2) and sets out how cases are taken up, including criminal contempt before the Supreme Court (Section 15) [1].
• Safeguards for speech: the Act protects fair criticism of cases already decided (Section 5). It bars punishment unless justice is "substantially" interfered with, and it allows truth as a defence (Section 13) [1].
• Proportionality: punishment is capped at six months' simple imprisonment or a ₹2,000 fine, or both. A bona fide apology may close the case (Section 12) [1].
• Gatekeeping: a private person needs the consent of the Attorney General or Solicitor General to start criminal contempt (Section 15). This filters out politically motivated pleas [1].
• Gap: the Act does not define "scandalising the court". The term is borrowed from English common law.

Does the statute limit the Court's inherent powers?

• No, as a matter of law: in its judgment of 27 April 2020, the Supreme Court held that the Act's limits on punishment and time do not "stultify or abrogate" its Article 129 power [2].
• Law Commission agrees: its 274th Report (2018) said the powers of the Supreme Court and High Courts exist apart from the Act. It recommended no amendment [3].
• Self-restraint in practice: the Court usually follows the Act's procedure and safeguards as guidelines, even though they do not bind it.
• Real limits are constitutional: Article 19(2) allows only reasonable restrictions, and Article 21 requires fair procedure. In SCBA v. Union of India (1998), the Court held that Articles 129/142 cannot be used to suspend an advocate's licence, because that power belongs to the Bar Councils.
• Concerns: the Court acts as judge in its own cause, and "scandalise" is vague. The UK has abolished this offence [3].

Overall, Article 129 is the source of the power and the 1971 Act regulates how it is used, but the Act cannot cut it down. Parliament could define "scandalising" narrowly, and the Court could treat Sections 5, 12 and 13 as binding on itself. That would let contempt law protect judicial independence while respecting the free speech guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a).