Discuss the role of the Attorney-General's consent under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 as a safeguard against misuse of contempt jurisdiction.

Under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, a private person can move the Supreme Court for criminal contempt only with the written consent of the Attorney-General (AG) or Solicitor-General (SG) [2]. The SCBA filed its recent petition against a journalist and an MP over remarks on the CJI with the AG's consent [1]. The case shows that this filter is useful but has gaps.

Role of consent as a safeguard

• Screens out frivolous petitions: A law officer must apply an independent mind before personal grievances or plain criticism reach the court [2].
• Protects free speech: Article 19(2) allows contempt as a restriction on speech. The filter keeps that restriction from being used casually against critics.
• Reduces the caseload: The Law Commission recorded 96,993 civil and 583 criminal contempt cases pending in the High Courts and the SC [3]. Gatekeeping keeps the criminal limb from growing the same way.
• Keeps judges out of starting cases: A third party, not the offended court, vets the complaint. In the current case, the SCBA petition went to court through AG R. Venkataramani [1].

Limits of the safeguard

• The gatekeeper belongs to the executive: The AG and SG are appointed by the Union government. One respondent is an opposition MP, and the SG argued that the remarks were "deliberate" pressure on judges [1]. This risks a perception of partisanship.
• No reasons are required: Section 15 asks only for written consent, not a reasoned order [2]. The public cannot check whether consent is given consistently.
• The court can bypass it: The court may act suo motu [2]. The SC has also held that its contempt power is inherent under Article 129 and that Section 15 is only procedural (Re Vijay Kurle, 2020) [4].
• It filters entry only: It does not address nemo judex in causa sua (no one should judge their own cause). The CJI sits on the Bench hearing remarks made against him [1].

Way forward

• The AG and SG should give published, reasoned consent orders.
• Courts should test the truth and good-faith defence under Section 13 at an early stage [2].
• Cases about remarks against a particular judge should be listed before a Bench that does not include that judge.

The AG's consent is a valuable first filter, but it cannot alone prevent misuse when the court can bypass it and the executive controls it. The Law Commission chose to retain criminal contempt [3]. Because the law was not narrowed, transparent consent and judicial restraint must protect both the court's dignity and the right to criticise it under Article 19(1)(a).