"The power to punish for 'scandalising the court' is a colonial relic incompatible with a mature democracy." Critically examine this in light of recent contempt proceedings.

Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 treats any publication that "scandalises or lowers the authority" of a court as criminal contempt [2]. The debate has returned because the Supreme Court has issued notice to journalist Nikhil Wagle and Rajya Sabha MP Sanjay Raut over their remarks against CJI Surya Kant [1]. The charge of "colonial relic" is largely valid, but deliberate pressure on judges still needs a narrow remedy.

Why it looks like a colonial relic

• Abandoned by its originator: The offence comes from English common law, but the UK abolished it. Its last prosecution there was in 1931 [3].
• Judge in own cause: The CJI sits on the Bench hearing remarks aimed at him. He also criticised the respondents orally before any hearing [1]. This offends nemo judex in causa sua (no one should judge their own cause).
• Weak filter: A private petition needs the written consent of the AG/SG [2]. Both are Union law officers. Here the SG argued that the remarks were "deliberate" [1], and one respondent is an opposition MP.
• Chilling effect: In Prashant Bhushan (2020), a conviction over tweets ended in a token fine. The trial itself became the punishment. There is also no appeal against an original SC conviction.
• Free speech: Criticising judges is part of Art. 19(1)(a) and of judicial accountability.

Why the power may still be needed

• Constitutional basis: Arts. 129 and 215 make the SC and HCs courts of record with contempt powers. Art. 19(2) lists contempt as a reasonable restriction on speech.
• Real harm: The SCBA argued that comments by public figures "instigate" others [1]. An organised campaign to pressure judges threatens fair adjudication.
• Law Commission (274th Report, 2018) kept the offence. It cited heavy pendency (583 criminal and 96,993 civil contempt cases) and the risk of leaving a gap in the law [3].
• Safeguards exist: Section 13 lets truth be a defence when a statement is made in the public interest and in good faith [2].

Overall, the problem lies less in the power's existence than in how widely it is used. The 'scandalising' limb should be limited to actual obstruction of justice, not hurt dignity. Four reforms would help: recusal by the targeted judge, published reasons for the AG's consent, a statutory appeal, and testing the Section 13 defence first. Together they would balance Art. 19 with judicial independence. A mature democracy earns respect for its courts through persuasion and restraint, not punishment.