Discuss the shift from informal moral suasion to statutory directions in regulating private-sector pricing during emergencies, using civil aviation as a case study.

Moral suasion means the State persuading private firms without legal compulsion. In civil aviation, fares are set by the market, and in crises the Centre long relied on such appeals. Rules notified on 31 October 2026 under the Bharatiya Vayuyan Adhiniyam, 2024 now let the Union government issue written fare directions in "extraordinary situations" [1]. Persuasion has become law.

Phase I: Persuasion and self-regulation

• Informal appeals to restrain fares during the Kumbh Mela, after the Pahalgam attack and during the Kerala floods [1].
• A Parliamentary Standing Committee found that airlines overcharged despite DGCA oversight. It urged that the DGCA be given power to regulate tariffs [4].
• Capacity nudges: in October 2025, DGCA asked airlines to add festive flights, and carriers committed hundreds of extra flights [3].

Drivers of the shift

• Crisis exposure: IndiGo's December 2025 meltdown cancelled nearly 5,000 flights [1]. The Ministry then invoked its regulatory powers and set distance-based caps of ₹7,500–18,000 [2].
• Judicial catalyst: a PIL by S. Laxminarayan sought binding norms against arbitrary fares and ancillary charges [1].
• Accountability: written directions leave a paper trail, unlike informal phone calls.

Features of the statutory regime

• Market pricing stays the default. The State intervenes only in the public interest during extraordinary situations [1].
• Transparency: airlines must publish tariffs online and file them with the DGCA [1]. This reduces information asymmetry.

Concerns

• Undefined trigger: "extraordinary situations" is not defined [1], which gives the executive wide discretion. The IndiGo cap had no fixed end date and ran "until the situation stabilises" [2].
• Narrow scope: the IndiGo cap excluded taxes and fees, and it exempted business-class and UDAN flights [2]. Costs can shift to add-on charges.
• Supply blind spot: caps add no seats. The Ministry decides on caps while the DGCA only monitors filings [1].
• Delegated legislation gets little parliamentary debate. The Committee on Subordinate Legislation should review it.

The shift turns ad hoc persuasion into rule-bound, accountable intervention while keeping market pricing. Next steps should be:

• clearly listed triggers and sunset clauses;
• caps that cover the full ticket price;
• adding capacity first and capping fares second;
• a dedicated fare-monitoring body, as Parliament's committee urged [4].

This would make emergency pricing powers consistent with Article 14's protection against arbitrary action and with consumer welfare.