Disinvestment receipts have chronically fallen short of budget estimates. Examine the reasons and suggest measures to make disinvestment a dependable fiscal tool.
New · District CollectorCan you hold the district for 72 hours?Floods, a heatwave, an outbreak, a grievance queue. Take the decisions, see the consequences.Play →Disinvestment is the sale of government equity in CPSEs. It is meant to be a non-debt capital receipt that funds the budget without extra borrowing. Yet actual receipts met budget estimates only in 2017-18 and 2018-19 [1]. In FY22, only ₹9,330 crore had come in by late January against a record ₹1.75 lakh crore target [2]. The shortfall is structural, not cyclical.
Reasons for the chronic shortfall
- Timeline mismatch: a strategic sale needs valuation, bidders and good market conditions, which rarely fit inside one budget year. Only 4 of 24 CPSEs approved for strategic sale had been sold by 2018-19 [3].
- Optimistic annual targets: the FY23 target was ₹65,000 crore [4], but receipts were ₹30,184 crore. FY24 fell further, to ₹15,220 crore [5].
- Weak private appetite: state entities fill the gap. LIC bought most of the Rail Vikas Nigam shares [6]. The CAG called NTPC's acquisitions "sector consolidation" [7].
- Valuation risk: in the Kamarajar Port sale, undocumented discounts changed the reserve price by about ₹576 crore [7]. This invites audit scrutiny and makes officials cautious.
- Political economy: union resistance, worries about job security and reservation, and market volatility delay OFS and IPO timing.
Measures to make disinvestment dependable
- Multi-year rolling pipeline: publish a sale calendar and review it every year, as NITI Aayog's National Monetisation Pipeline does with its ₹6 lakh crore, four-year plan [8].
- Policy consistency: follow the New PSE Policy, 2021, which keeps a minimum presence in four strategic sectors and privatises or closes CPSEs in the rest [9]. This gives investors predictability.
- Transparent valuation: write down valuation assumptions, apply them the same way in every sale, and have an Independent External Monitor check them while the sale is under way [7].
- Honest accounting: report sales to government buyers separately from sales to private buyers in budget documents.
- Ring-fence proceeds for capital creation: use the National Investment Fund route, which funded asset-creating schemes like MGNREGA and IAY in 2009-12 [10]. This avoids "selling the family silver" to pay recurring expenditure.
- Bridge strategy: use calibrated minority OFS sales while strategic sales mature, with employee share options and social safeguards to reduce resistance.
The shortfalls come from treating a multi-year structural reform as a single annual revenue line. A rolling pipeline, transparent valuation and capex-linked use of proceeds can make disinvestment a credible pillar of fiscal consolidation under the FRBM framework. That would release locked public capital while advancing the New PSE Policy's vision of a leaner, more efficient State.
Sources
- 1PRS Legislative Research, Vital Stats on Disinvestmenttargets met only in 2017-18 and 2018-19
- 2Economic Survey 2021-22, Ch. 2 "Fiscal Developments"FY22 BE ₹1.75 lakh crore; ₹9,330 crore received by 24 Jan 2022
- 3CAG Report No. 18 of 2019, Ch. VIII: Disinvestment in CPSEs4 of 24 strategic sales completed
- 4Economic Survey 2022-23, Ch. 3 "Fiscal Developments"FY23 BE ₹65,000 crore
- 5CAG Audit Report No. 19 of 2025, Union GovernmentFY23 receipts ₹30,184 crore; FY24 ₹15,220 crore
- 6CAG Press Release on Report No. 27LIC bought most RVNL shares
- 7CAG Report No. 12 of 2021, Ch. III: Disinvestment ProcessNTPC "sector consolidation"; Kamarajar reserve-price impact; recommendation for an Independent External Monitor
- 8PIB: Finance Minister launches the National Monetisation PipelineNITI Aayog; ₹6 lakh crore over FY22–FY25
- 9PIB: Policy of Strategic Disinvestment announcedNew PSE Policy, strategic and non-strategic sectors
- 10Receipts Budget 2010-11, Capital ReceiptsNIF proceeds used for asset-creating social schemes