Dual power centres in Union Territories with legislatures impede accountable governance. Discuss.

Articles 239A and 239AA of the Constitution allow some Union Territories (UTs) to have elected legislatures, such as Puducherry and Delhi. J&K joined them after the 2019 Reorganisation Act. In these UTs, an elected Chief Minister works alongside a Lieutenant Governor (LG) appointed by the Centre. When the line between their powers is blurred, voters cannot tell who is answerable to them.

How dual power centres weaken accountability

• Split subjects: The J&K Assembly cannot make laws on "Police" and "Public Order" [1]. Voters still hold the elected government responsible for law and order that it does not control.
• LG as final authority: The President administers J&K through the LG. The Council of Ministers only "aids and advises" [1], so the real decisions move away from the people who face elections.
• Statutory tilt: The GNCTD (Amendment) Act, 2021 says "government" means the LG. It also requires the LG's opinion before ministers' decisions are acted on in specified matters [2]. This delays files and blurs who owns each decision.
• Two masters for the bureaucracy: In May 2023 the Supreme Court gave Delhi's government control over services. It relied on the "triple chain of accountability": officials answer to ministers, ministers to the legislature, and the legislature to voters [3]. The 2023 Amendment let the LG act in his sole discretion on the recommendations of the civil services authority [4]. That breaks the chain.
• Thin executive: J&K's Council of Ministers is capped at 10% of the Assembly [1].
• Result: Blame-shifting, drawn-out litigation and governance run from the courts.

The case for shared control

• National interest: Delhi is the national capital. Article 239AA itself keeps police, public order and land outside the Assembly's control.
• Security: J&K is a sensitive border region. Central control of police [1] allows unified command against insurgency.
• Constitutional design: UTs are not States. Shared power is intended, and the harm comes from grey zones rather than from the dual structure itself.

Dual power centres weaken accountability because authority and answerability no longer sit with the same office. The fix is clear, codified division of subjects. The LG should be bound by ministerial advice outside reserved subjects, and there should be time-bound mechanisms to settle disputes. J&K's Statehood should be restored on a published timeline. Restoring the Court's triple chain of accountability [3] would respect both cooperative federalism and democratic self-government.