"Education being in the Concurrent List has turned Centre–State relations in the sector into an arena of contestation rather than cooperation." Critically examine, with reference to NEP 2020 and conditional central schemes.

The 42nd Amendment (1976) moved education to the Concurrent List [1], so both the Union and the States can legislate on it. Since NEP 2020, NEP-linked centrally sponsored schemes have made this shared field more adversarial. But the friction comes more from fiscal conditionality and partisan politics than from the List itself.

Signs of contestation

• Conditional grants: To join PM SHRI (2022), a State must sign an MoU committing to NEP 2020 [2]. Samagra Shiksha (2021–26) was approved as "fully aligned" with NEP, with a Central share of about ₹1.85 lakh crore [3].
• Leverage across schemes: Tamil Nadu, Kerala and West Bengal did not sign the PM SHRI MoU. The Centre then withheld their Samagra Shiksha funds, which the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Education called "not justifiable" [4].
• Cost to schools: The Committee warned that the held-back funds disrupt teachers' salaries, training and school maintenance [4].
• Ideological blocs: In September 2026, Congress-ruled States agreed to draw up education "action plans" against what the party called the RSS's "divisive agenda" [5]. This is a party bloc, not a federal institution.

Signs of cooperation

• Consultation: NEP was finalised after consulting the States. The Ministry shared a task-linked implementation plan, and States set up their own task forces [6].
• Limited dispute: The Committee named only three States in the dispute. Most have implemented both schemes [4].
• Shared goal: NEP restates the target of 6% of GDP as public spending on education, which the Centre and States can only reach together [7].
• Legitimate conditions: Tying national funds to national standards supports accountability and makes it easier for students who move between States.

Assessment The Concurrent List makes cooperation possible. Contestation starts when (i) the conditions of an optional scheme are enforced by holding back core funding, and (ii) the curriculum becomes a partisan battleground for either side.

So the statement is only partly valid: the conflict is political and fiscal, not constitutional. The way forward is to delink Samagra Shiksha releases from PM SHRI, as the Committee recommended [4]. Conditions should reward learning outcomes rather than adoption of a policy. A standing Centre–State forum such as CABE could settle terms before funds stop. Together, these steps would return education to cooperative federalism and support progress towards SDG 4.