Evaluate China's dual role as a rule-taker within existing multilateral institutions (WTO, UN) and a rule-maker through alternative institutions (BRI, AIIB, NDB). How does this challenge the liberal international order?

Q. Evaluate China's dual role as a rule-taker within existing multilateral institutions (WTO, UN) and a rule-maker through alternative institutions (BRI, AIIB, NDB). How does this challenge the liberal international order? (15 marks, 250-350 words)

China is simultaneously the largest beneficiary of the post-1945 order and its most consequential revisionist. Evaluating both roles suggests it seeks not to dismantle the liberal order but to reweight its authorship in favour of the Global South.

As rule-taker: gains from working within - WTO accession (11 December 2001) as the 143rd member locked China into rules-based trade and powered its rise to the largest goods-trading nation [1]. - Renminbi's entry into the IMF's SDR basket (effective 1 October 2016) as the fifth currency signalled acceptance of, and by, existing monetary governance [2]. - As a P5 member, China accepts UN Charter Article 27(3) procedure — and uses the accompanying veto over substantive resolutions, while remaining the largest P5 contributor of peacekeeping troops [3].

As rule-maker: building the parallel architecture - AIIB (operational 2016, Beijing-headquartered, USD 100 billion capital, 57 founding members) offers infrastructure finance outside Bretton Woods conditionality [4]. - NDB (BRICS, 2015, Shanghai) institutionalises South-South development finance with India as co-founder [5]. - BRI (2013) reshapes connectivity: the World Bank estimates corridor transit times could fall up to 12%, but flags high debt levels in about a quarter of corridor economies [6].

Evaluation: the challenge to the liberal order The challenge is normative, not structural. China contests content — sovereignty, non-interference and development outcomes — rather than multilateralism itself, substituting conditionality-free finance for governance-linked lending. Veto use to shield partners weakens collective security from within [3], while transparency and debt-sustainability gaps limit the alternative model's credibility [6].

Verdict: China is an insider reformer with revisionist instruments — its dual role dilutes Western normative primacy without offering a fully accountable substitute. For India, the prudent course is issue-based engagement: cooperating within BRICS and the NDB, resisting sovereignty-violating BRI corridors, and pressing for genuine UNSC reform so that a plural order rests on representation rather than rivalry.

(~330 words)

Sources: 1. WTO — China: Member information — accession on 11 December 2001 as the 143rd member 2. IMF — Executive Board Completes Review of SDR Basket, Includes Chinese Renminbi — renminbi as fifth SDR currency, effective 1 October 2016 3. UN Security Council — Voting System (Charter Article 27) — P5 veto over non-procedural matters 4. AIIB — Our History — 2016 inaugural Board of Governors in Beijing, 57 founding members, USD 100 billion capital 5. New Development Bank — History — BRICS-established bank (2015), Shanghai headquarters 6. World Bank — Belt and Road Economics: Opportunities and Risks of Transport Corridors (2019) — up to 12% transit-time reduction; high debt in about a quarter of corridor economies