Evaluate the role of a judiciary-led selection body in ensuring the independence of quasi-judicial institutions in India.

Tribunals set up under Articles 323A/323B often decide cases in which the government itself is a party. In 2025, Madras Bar Association v. UoI struck down the 2021 Act's provisions on selection and tenure [4][5]. Parliament responded with the Tribunal Reforms Bill, 2026, which created a judiciary-led National Tribunals Commission (NTC) [1]. The NTC is a major safeguard but an incomplete one.

Strengths of a judiciary-led body

• Judicial majority: The chair must be a former SC Judge or HC Chief Justice, and the members are 2 judicial plus 2 technical [1]. This replaces direct Central Government control [1].
• Merit-based selection: Search-cum-selection committees use expert evaluation, personal interaction and written exercises [6].
• Accountability outside the executive: The NTC reviews tribunal performance and oversees misconduct inquiries [1][6].
• Fewer vacancies: Recruitment for 16 tribunals must start 6 months before a post falls vacant [6]. The National Tribunals Data Grid allows monitoring [1].
• Economic gain: Faster tax and company adjudication improves ease of doing business.

Limitations

• The executive picks the selectors: The Central Government appoints NTC members and only consults the CJI [2].
• Pocket veto: The government has three months to appoint [2]. The SC wanted the committee's recommendation to be final [3].
• Reappointment pressure: Reappointment depends on "previous work performance". Short terms (5 years, or until age 67) [2] tempt members to avoid rulings that upset a government litigant.
• Administrative control: The 2021 Rules gave the Centre power over leave despite SC rulings [3]. The NTC itself arrived months after the Court's 4-month deadline [4].
• Counter-view: Judges choosing judges raises its own accountability concerns, as in the NJAC debate. Technical posts also justify some role for the government.

Verdict A judiciary-led body is necessary but not sufficient. Independence depends on who controls appointment, tenure and day-to-day administration.

Overall, the NTC moves tribunal selection from executive discretion towards judicial primacy and merit. It should be strengthened by:

• treating a recommendation as approved if the government does not act by the deadline;
• choosing NTC members through a panel that includes the CJI;
• transferring leave and administration to the NTC;
• publishing vacancy data publicly.

These steps would protect the separation of powers and advance SDG 16's goal of accountable institutions.