Examine how constitutional reform in Sri Lanka regarding the Executive Presidency reflects broader South Asian trends in executive accountability.

Q. Examine how constitutional reform in Sri Lanka regarding the Executive Presidency reflects broader South Asian trends in executive accountability. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Sri Lanka's Executive Presidency, created by the 1978 Constitution under J.R. Jayewardene, concentrated head-of-state and head-of-government powers in one office [1]. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake's renewed pledge to abolish it through "national consensus" places Sri Lanka within a wider South Asian shift from personalised executives toward legislature-anchored accountability.

The Sri Lankan reform demand - The 1978 model made the President independent of Parliament, commander-in-chief and cabinet head — a design long faulted for over-centralisation [1]. - The NPP government seeks a parliamentary-accountable executive and greater decentralisation, but abolition needs a two-thirds majority and possibly a referendum, forcing cross-party bargaining. - Reform is entangled with minority representation: Tamil, Muslim and Malaiyaha Tamil parties, now consolidated as the Political Council for Tamil-Speaking People, demand a new Constitution, overdue Provincial Council polls and land-dispute settlement [2].

Parallel South Asian trends - Pakistan's 18th Amendment (2010) stripped the President's unilateral power to dissolve Parliament, converting a semi-presidential system into a parliamentary republic [3] — the closest analogue to Sri Lanka's debate. - Nepal and Bangladesh likewise settled on ceremonial presidencies with executives answerable to the legislature; India's Westminster design keeps the Council of Ministers collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha. - Common driver: post-crisis public backlash against unaccountable executives, channelled into constitutional rather than extra-constitutional correction.

Counter-currents and limits - Sri Lanka's own record is cyclical — powers trimmed and later restored — showing reform can reverse without consensus. - Devolution remains the harder half: the 13th Amendment (1987), born of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, created Provincial Councils with powers over land, police, education and health [4], yet elections have been stalled since 2018.

Abolishing the Executive Presidency is therefore necessary but not sufficient; accountability deepens only when vertical devolution accompanies horizontal checks. A consensus-built Constitution that revives Provincial Councils would strengthen Sri Lanka's pluralism, honour Accord commitments valued by India, and confirm South Asia's convergence on executives answerable to elected legislatures.

(~325 words)

Sources: 1. Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 1978 — Parliament of Sri Lanka — creation and design of the Executive Presidency 2. Dissanayake says he favours 'national consensus' before drafting Constitution — The Hindu — AKD's consensus approach; Tamil-speaking parties' common platform and demands 3. The Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010 — National Assembly of Pakistan — curbing presidential powers, shift to parliamentary republic 4. Indo-Lanka Accord, Colombo, 29 July 1987 — Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India — origin of the 13th Amendment and Provincial Council devolution