·The Hindu·15 marks·250–350 wordsEconomy

Examine the evolution of SEBI's regulatory approach toward short selling in India since the early 2000s.

In this answer
  1. Phase I — Restrictive legacy (early 2000s)
  2. Phase II — Legitimisation (2007–08)
  3. Phase III — Consolidation and caution (2017–20)
  4. Phase IV — Codification and re-liberalisation (2024 onwards)

Short selling — sale of securities the seller does not own — is operationalised through the Securities Lending and Borrowing (SLB) mechanism. Since the early 2000s SEBI has shifted from scam-induced prohibition to a screened, calibrated liberalisation, without ever conceding on settlement discipline.

Phase I — Restrictive legacy (early 2000s)

  • Stock market scam scandals exposed settlement and manipulation risk, prompting tighter cash-equities rules [5].
  • Lending remained confined to the Securities Lending Scheme, 1997, with clearing corporations acting as Approved Intermediaries [2].

Phase II — Legitimisation (2007–08)

  • The December 2007 circular permitted short selling by all classes of investors, retail and institutional [1].
  • Naked short selling was barred: delivery at settlement made mandatory; institutions must disclose the short upfront and cannot square off intra-day [1].
  • A screen-based SLB platform was created, with order matching and tenure up to seven days [2].

Phase III — Consolidation and caution (2017–20)

  • The November 2017 review circular strengthened SLB operations [3].
  • Collateral was retained at up to 130%, against roughly 100% in the US and Europe — a deliberately conservative buffer [5].
  • Eligibility was tethered to the F&O segment: minimum average monthly turnover of ₹1 billion and market-wide derivatives exposure of ₹1 billion, leaving only 176 of NSE's ~2,600 listed companies eligible [5].

Phase IV — Codification and re-liberalisation (2024 onwards)

  • SEBI's Framework for Short Selling (January 2024) consolidated scattered norms into a single code [4].
  • SEBI is now deliberating a near doubling of eligible stocks to about 350 and a cut in collateral, to deepen the cash market and draw retail investors away from the riskier derivatives segment [5].

The trajectory shows a regulator that legitimised short selling as a price-discovery tool while ring-fencing it against default risk. Going forward, widening the lendable universe on liquidity-based rather than derivatives-linked criteria, paired with strong surveillance and investor awareness, can deliver a deeper, fairer cash market — the balance between market development and investor protection that SEBI's founding mandate envisages.

Sources

  1. 1SEBI, "Short selling and securities lending and borrowing", Circular MRD/DoP/SE/Dep/Cir-14/2007 (20 Dec 2007)short selling permitted for all investor classes; naked short selling prohibited; institutional disclosure and no intra-day squaring off
  2. 2SEBI, Annexure — Broad framework for securities lending and borrowingSecurities Lending Scheme 1997, Approved Intermediaries, screen-based platform, seven-day tenure
  3. 3SEBI, "Circular on Review of Securities Lending and Borrowing Mechanism", CIR/MRD/DP/122/2017 (17 Nov 2017)2017 strengthening of the SLB framework
  4. 4SEBI, "Framework for Short Selling", SEBI/HO/MRD/MRD-PoD-3/P/CIR/2024/1 (5 Jan 2024)consolidated short-selling framework
  5. 5Business Standard, "Sebi plans to nearly double stocks eligible for lending and borrowing" (6 July 2026)early-2000s tightening; 176 of ~2,600 NSE stocks eligible; ₹1 billion turnover and derivatives-exposure thresholds; 130% vs ~100% collateral; proposed expansion to ~350 stocks

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