Examine how India can diversify its energy import routes to mitigate risks arising from instability in West Asia.

Q. Examine how India can diversify its energy import routes to mitigate risks arising from instability in West Asia. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

The Strait of Hormuz carries about 20 million barrels a day — roughly a quarter of global seaborne oil trade — through a channel only 29 nautical miles wide [1]. Recurring West Asian conflict makes route diversification, not merely supplier diversification, central to India's energy security.

Nature of the risk - Chokepoint concentration: with Asia absorbing the bulk of Hormuz-transiting crude, a single closure event transmits directly into India's import bill [1]. - Weaponisation of the passage: during the collapse of the June 2026 US–Iran understanding, its safe-passage clause became the flashpoint and the IRGC announced a temporary closure [5]. - Thin fallback capacity: bypass pipelines via Saudi Arabia's Red Sea route and the UAE's Fujairah line offer only 3.5–5.5 mb/d of spare capacity, untested at crisis volumes [1]. - Secondary effects follow through freight, war-risk insurance and tanker availability, not just crude prices.

Diversifying the routes - Geographic re-sourcing: oil PSUs now lift crude from around 40 countries across the Americas, Africa and Eurasia; consequently about 70% of India's crude imports now arrive by routes outside Hormuz, against roughly 55% earlier [2]. - Alternative maritime gateways: Chabahar, on the Gulf of Oman, lies outside the Strait; the 10-year Shahid Beheshti terminal contract (May 2024) links it to the INSTC, offering a Hormuz-independent corridor to Eurasia [4]. - Long-haul contracting with Atlantic-basin and Russian suppliers spreads exposure across sea lanes rather than one passage.

Building resilience behind the routes - Strategic Petroleum Reserves: 5.33 MMT at Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru and Padur, with a further 6.5 MMT approved at Chandikhol and Padur on PPP mode [3]. - Demand-side measures — ethanol blending, renewables and electric mobility — structurally shrink the exposed volume.

India's vulnerability is thus increasingly manageable rather than absolute. Sustained investment in non-Gulf sourcing, Chabahar–INSTC connectivity and deeper reserves, aligned with SDG-7, can convert a geographic chokepoint into a hedged, diversified supply architecture.

(~335 words)

Sources: 1. Strait of Hormuz — IEA factsheet (Feb 2026) — transit volume, 29 nm width, ~25% of seaborne oil trade, Asian share, 3.5–5.5 mb/d bypass pipeline capacity 2. PIB, "70% of India's Crude Imports Now Routed Outside Strait of Hormuz" — Inter-Ministerial Briefing on West Asia — ~40 source countries; shift from ~55% to ~70% of imports outside Hormuz 3. PIB, "Government steps to Strengthen Strategic Petroleum Reserves" — SPR Phase-I 5.33 MMT at three sites; Phase-II 6.5 MMT at Chandikhol and Padur 4. PIB, "Long-term Main Contract for development of Shahid Beheshti Port Terminal, Chabahar" (13 May 2024) — 10-year Chabahar terminal contract and INSTC linkage 5. The Hindu, "For Iran, Hormuz is the key to deterrence and dominance in Persian Gulf" — collapse of the June 2026 US–Iran MoU, safe-passage clause dispute, IRGC closure announcement