Examine whether the Election Commission's functioning as a multi-member body adequately safeguards its independence and collective decision-making.

Article 324(2) allows the Election Commission of India (ECI) to consist of a Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and other Election Commissioners (ECs) [1]. It has been a three-member body since 1993, a change meant to replace one-person control with collective checks. The multi-member form offers only partial safeguards. Recent reports that two ECs objected to decisions taken during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls show the gap [3].

How the multi-member design helps

• Collegial rule: all business is to be transacted unanimously, and differences are settled by majority [2]. In T.N. Seshan v. Union of India (1995), the Supreme Court upheld this model.
• Security of tenure for the CEC: the CEC can be removed only in the manner of a Supreme Court judge [2].
• Plurality of views: the reported dissent of two ECs during SIR [3] shows the design does allow internal checks.

Gaps in independence

• Appointments: Anoop Baranwal (2023) placed the CJI on the selection panel. The 2023 Act replaced the CJI with a Union Cabinet Minister, which gives the government a majority on the panel [4].
• Unequal protection: ECs can be removed on the CEC's recommendation [2]. PRS flags this lack of parity despite their equal status [4].
• Service conditions: pay is now linked to the Cabinet Secretary's, which is set by the executive rather than by Parliament. The ECI also has no independent secretariat [4].

Gaps in collective decision-making

• No public record: dissent notes are not disclosed, and the objections to SIR decisions came to light only through a media report [3].
• Legitimacy deficit: Kapil Sibal urged the Supreme Court to set aside decisions that were "not the decisions of the full Commission" [3]. Opaque decisions invite litigation.
• CEC dominance: because the CEC can recommend an EC's removal, ECs may hesitate to dissent. The CEC is legally first among equals but dominant in practice.

Way forward

• A neutral selection panel that includes the CJI, in line with Baranwal [4].
• Removal protection for ECs equal to the CEC's, as the Law Commission's 255th Report recommended.
• Recorded and published majority and dissent on major orders, such as roll revisions.
• An independent secretariat and a budget charged on the Consolidated Fund.

The multi-member form gives the ECI a legal basis for collective checks. Real independence, however, depends on neutral appointments, equal security of tenure and transparent decisions. These reforms would move the ECI from nominal to genuine collegiality and uphold Article 324's promise of free and fair elections, a basic feature of the Constitution.