Examine whether the *sub judice* convention and judicial aloofness strengthen or weaken public confidence in the judiciary during political crises.

The sub judice convention says no one should comment on or act in a way that could prejudice a case still before a court. Judicial aloofness keeps judges away from political actors and debates. In October 2026, CJI Surya Kant declined a meeting request from the Leader of the Opposition "with reasons". His office said the issues were already sub judice and that fundamental-rights grievances must come to the court on its judicial side [1]. On balance, both norms strengthen confidence, but only if they are applied openly.

How they strengthen public confidence

• Equality before the court: a private audience for one political side would give access that no ordinary litigant gets. The CJI pointed instead to the judicial route under Article 32 [1].
• Neutrality in a crisis: the CJI expressed no view on the opposition march to the Supreme Court [1]. This kept the court out of street politics.
• The remedy was not denied: petitions on the protest against the CEC and the Delhi clampdown were listed for the next day [1]. Aloofness did not mean the court was closed.
• Fair trial: the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 protects pending cases from outside pressure.

How they may weaken it

• The court can look distant: protesters had faced a clampdown [1]. If judges meet no one outside a hearing, the court can seem remote from citizens' grievances.
• Only half transparent: the reasons reached the public through unnamed "sources" [1], which invites suspicion of political motive.
• Convention, not law: the 1997 Restatement of Values of Judicial Life has no legal authority and cannot be enforced [3]. Restraint depends on the judgment of whoever holds the office.
• A less visible administrative side: the CJI's "Master of the Roster" power to allocate cases is less open to scrutiny than what happens in a courtroom.

Way forward

• The Supreme Court could publish a protocol on meeting requests linked to pending matters, using its rule-making power under Article 145.
• Recorded reasons for administrative decisions in politically sensitive cases.
• Bring back a statutory code like the Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010. It would have barred judges from public debate on political matters and set up a National Judicial Oversight Committee to handle complaints [2].

The sub judice rule and aloofness protect the judiciary from political capture; they are not walls against citizens. Combined with quick listing of cases, reasons given on record and written conduct standards, restraint becomes fairness people can see. This upholds the separation of powers in Article 50 and the principle that justice must be done and also be seen to be done.