How far can the judiciary oversee the administrative decisions of the Election Commission without weakening its constitutional independence? Illustrate with recent developments.

Article 324 gives the Election Commission of India (ECI) "superintendence, direction and control" of elections. In Mohinder Singh Gill (1978), however, the Supreme Court held that this power must operate within the law and fairly. The Special Intensive Revision (SIR) hearings show that judicial oversight works best when it checks legality, not administration.

Legitimate scope of oversight: recent illustrations

• Protecting adult suffrage (Art 326): During the Bihar SIR, the Court told the ECI to accept Aadhaar as a 12th document for identity. It added that Aadhaar is not proof of citizenship [1].
• Securing independence: In Anoop Baranwal (2023), the Court placed the CJI on the CEC selection panel until Parliament made a law [2].
• Fixing ownership: In October 2026 the Court said it had not made or approved the changes to Form 6, which asked whether an applicant's parents or grandparents were on the last SIR roll. This placed accountability for the change on the ECI [3].

Limits: where oversight would erode independence

• Continuity of elections: The Bench refused to suspend the CEC. Justice Bagchi asked, "who will conduct elections?" [3]
• Art 329(b): Courts cannot interfere midway in the electoral process. Disputes go through election petitions after polls.
• Legislative domain: The 2023 Act replaced the CJI with a Cabinet Minister on the selection panel [2]. Courts can test whether this is valid, but they cannot redesign it.
• Statutory immunity: Section 16 bars courts from hearing cases against serving or former CEC/ECs over official acts [4]. The Bench noted that even judges do not have such protection [3], which raises Art 14 concerns.

Calibrated approach

• Review the process (whether it is arbitrary, exclusionary or outside the rules), not the policy choice.
• Require changes to eligibility forms to go through notified Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, not online edits.
• Limit Section 16 to good-faith acts. Create the independent secretariat recommended by the Goswami Committee [2].

Recent developments show that judicial review protects the franchise when it targets illegality. Restraint, in turn, protects the conduct of elections. A process-focused review, along with Parliament restoring a neutral appointment panel and tighter immunity, would keep the ECI independent and accountable. This serves the free and fair elections that are part of the Constitution's basic structure.