"Freedom of navigation grounded in UNCLOS is a shared interest, not a bloc agenda." Evaluate India's maritime diplomacy with ASEAN in this light.

Freedom of navigation and overflight under UNCLOS benefits every state that depends on sea trade, not just one camp. At the 13th ADMM-Plus in Cebu (2026), India supported ASEAN centrality and UNCLOS-based passage [1]. Its diplomacy largely fits this "shared interest" framing. However, weak legal backing and thin economic ties reduce its weight.

Strengths: a shared-interest approach

• Not aimed at a bloc: India says its stress on freedom of navigation is "not against any country" and protects all regional stakeholders [3]. By backing ASEAN centrality, India lets ASEAN, not outside powers, set the agenda [1].
• Consistency: India gave an almost identical commitment to navigation, overflight and lawful commerce under UNCLOS at the 10th ADMM-Plus, Jakarta (2023) [2]. The position is stable, not opportunistic.
• Practitioner, not preacher: The Indian Navy has been in the Gulf of Aden since 2008, escorting ships regardless of flag [1]. This protects every user of the SLOCs (sea lanes of communication).
• Institutions: 2026 is the ASEAN-India Year of Maritime Cooperation, with the 2nd ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise and the Plan of Action 2026–30 [1]. India and Malaysia co-chair the EWG on Counter-Terrorism, with a table-top exercise (Malaysia, 2026) and a field exercise (India, 2027) [4].

Limitations

• Selective legalism: India only "noted" the 2016 South China Sea arbitral award made under UNCLOS and did not endorse it [5]. This weakens its rule-of-law claim before the Philippines, which won that case.
• Diffuse support: Staying neutral keeps all ASEAN states on board. The cost is that India's backing is useful to everyone but decisive for no one.
• Lopsided partnership: The AITIGA review was targeted to finish in 2025 [6] but is still under negotiation [7]. Defence ties are moving faster than trade, which makes the SLOC argument economically thin.
• Delivery gap: Offers made in speeches matter less than checkable results, such as how many partners join the 2027 field exercise [4].

Verdict: India's practice largely supports the statement. Its non-bloc, UNCLOS-based approach is credible, but it is cautious more than committed.

Overall, India's ASEAN maritime diplomacy treats freedom of navigation as a shared good, not a bloc agenda. To make this more credible, India should openly back UNCLOS outcomes, conclude the AITIGA review and publish what its EWG exercises achieve. This would turn its vision of a secure, open, inclusive and rule-based Indo-Pacific [1] into a partnership ASEAN can rely on.